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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
This study analyzes what the Montana supreme court 
has said about the office and powers of the Montana 
governor. It examines what the judges have said the gover­
nor can or cannot do, and seeks to determine whether the 
court through its decisions has strengthened or weakened 
the office and powers of the governor. The focus of the 
study is on the mode of interpretation used by the court 
to resolve questions concerning the governor’s office and 
powers when it lacks clear and definite constitutional or 
statutory direction. Since 1920, there has been increasing 
recognition of the need to have a strong executive in 
state government. The hypothesis of this study is that 
the Montana supreme court, when presented with a situation 
wherein the constitution or statute lacks prima facie 
clarity concerning the powers of the governor, should exer­
cise a mode of judicial interpretation consistent with 
strengthening the office and powers of the governor.
The study is justifiable for two reasons. It 
attempts to prove or disprove the hypothesis. But the more 
important reason is that in the next decade the fate of the
1
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50 states as elements of the American federal system will 
depend upon how the 50 governors exercise their official 
and unofficial powers. We must understand every aspect 
of the governors’ office and powers, including what state 
supreme courts are deciding with regard to them»
The Office and Powers of the 
Montana Governor
It is necessary at the outset to discuss two basic 
questions concerning executive behavior. First, what ic 
the office and what are powers of the Montana governor? 
Second, what identifies a strong governorship?
The office of governor is the highest elective 
executive position in Montana state government, with tenure 
for four years and various executive duties and responsl= 
bilities. In Montana, the office of governor exists so 
that the "supreme executive power of the state" can be 
vested in one executive officer whose responsibility is 
to "see that the laws are faithfully executed." Conse­
quently, more executive power rests in the office of gover­
nor than in any other executive office.
The powers of the Montana governor are both consti­
tutional and statutory; for the purposes of this study, the 
constitutional powers are more important. Some of the more
^Mont. Const., Art, VII, sec. 5
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important powers which this study reviews and considers 
include: the appointment and removal powers, the approval 
and veto powers, the pardon power, the militia power, the 
proclamation power (covering both elections and extra­
ordinary sessions), the right to succession, the power to 
call in a district judge, the power to approve state con­
tracts and the discretionary extradition powero This study 
does not undertake a comprehensive examination of all the 
governor’s powers; it is an analysis only of those powers 
which have occasioned a judicial test before the Montana 
high court.
The governor’s office combined with his powers 
creates the executive function, about which two schools of 
thought may be identified: the literalist school, and the
ostewardship school. The literalist school holds that the 
executive ’’can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and 
reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly 
implied and included within such express grant as proper and 
necessary to its exercise” ; whereas, the stewardship school 
holds that the executive could ”do anything that the needs 
of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by 
the constitution or by the laws.”3 Between these two
^These two schools of thought are usually discussed 
with reference to the presidential executive function.
3Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., I964), pp. 13-14.
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schools of thought, and with reference to their applica­
tion to the executive function in Montana government, the 
literalist view is preferred in this study, since it is 
more consistent with the spirit of the executive article 
of the Montana constitution. Recognizing that in consti­
tutional theory the national constitution grants presiden­
tial authority while a state constitution restricts guber­
natorial authority, Koenig^s distinction between a 
literalist and stewardship mode of interpretation is sug­
gestive that something like the literalist or strict mode 
of interpretation seems consistent with the spirit of the 
Montana executive article.
The Concept of a Strong Governor 
A strong governor is a state chief executive who 
brings masterful leadership to the exercise of substantial 
formal powers, responsibilities and organizational devices, 
such as (1) a single or near single (non-plural) executive, 
(2) broad appointment and removal powers, (3) four-year 
tenure with re-election permitted, (4) an executive bud­
get, (5) a veto power, (6) discretionary administrative 
decision-making power and (7) an emergency or crisis power. 
These are not the only powers, responsibilities and devices 
which contribute to a strong governorship; they illustrate 
the concept of a strong governor as used in this study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Many other factors may contribute to the final 
product of a strong governorship, such as self-confidence 
and effective personality traits. Certain important 
qualities, powers and devices will not always create and 
constitute a strong governorship. A good example to illus­
trate this point is a study which chose four criteria as 
indices and concluded that Montana had a strong governor­
ship when, in fact, the Montana governorship is far from 
strong.^
Once a strong governorship is created, what are 
some of the examples of leadership in the execution of the 
laws and the exercise of its powers? Among other things, 
the governor will desire and seek a strong legislature and 
judiciary. He will exercise his policy formation power In 
the legislature,^ He will recognize administrative prob- 
lems, and will be able to marshal the executive branch to 
meet and resolve them. He will resort to quick but just 
action in time of emergencies to keep order. He will 
inspire his fellow citizens to participate in government, 
and he will be imaginative and alert. Again, these are
^See Joseph A, Schlesinger, "The Politics of the 
Executive," Politics in the American States, ed, Herbert 
Jacob and Kenneth N, Vines (Boston” Little, Brown and 
Company, 1965), pp, 217-234»
5See Coleman B„ Ransone, Jr., The Office of Governo: 
in the United States (University, Alabama : University of
Alabama Press, 1956), chap, 7,
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only a few examples of uses of leadership inherent in a 
strong governor.
To place this study in historical perspective, it 
must be noted that the concept of a strong governorship is 
relatively new, and that the initial conception of the 
Montana governorship was that of a weak executive. 
Nationally, the movement for achieving and implementing a 
strong governorship began around 1920, and was given impetus 
by the recommendations of the various ”little Hoover Commis­
sions.” In the beginning of state government, the governor 
was nothing more than a figurehead.^ Even Montana’s con­
stitutional draftsmen, in 1889» seem to have regarded the 
governorship as "almost a sinecure" and "more of an orna­
ment than anything else."^ But much has happened in state 
government since then to modify earlier attitudes, and 
state courts, as instruments of state government, cannot 
have escaped the impact of these developments on their modes 
of interpretation.
Today the governor is the most powerful member of 
the executive branch, which is considered an equal to the 
state legislature or judiciary. For the achievement and
^See Leslie Lipson, The American Governor from 
Figurehead to Leader (Chicago! University of Chicago 
Press, 1939), chap.2.
7proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Con­
vention. 1889 (Helena:State Publishing Company, 1921),p. 442.
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utilization of a strong governorship the Montana supreme 
court should exercise a mode of interpretation consistent 
with this concept.
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CHAPTER II
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE 
FUNCTION BY MANDAMUS
Introduction
Mandamus may be defined as a command from a court 
of law directed to some legal entity compelling the per­
formance of a duty required by law. In Montana the office 
of governor is political and vests discretionary power in 
the chief executive, and since the office requires the 
exercise of discretion, the courts have held that mandamus 
cannot be issued against the governor to compel him to per­
form the executive function so long as he observes the laws 
and acts within the limits of his power and authority. 
However, there is one significant exception to this rule, 
which provides that the courts do have a judicial super­
visory power over the state executive to compel him to per­
form a purely ministerial act which comprehends a function 
of simple obedience or service.
A discretionary act is an act which the governor 
may or may not perform since he has the authority to make 
choices and decisions regarding the act; a ministerial act 
is an act which the governor must perform, since by
8
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nature this kind of act neither involves the use of dis­
cretion nor the opportunity to make choices. An example 
of a discretionary act would be the governor* s exercise of 
his authority to determine whether or not to extradite a 
fugitive from justice; an example of a ministerial act 
would be the governor*s obligation to issue a commission 
upon the happening of an event. Thus, where the nature of 
the act to be compelled is discretionary, the courts have 
no judicial control by mandamus over the governor*s per­
formance of the executive function; however, where the 
nature of the act is ministerial, the courts do have 
authority to compel the governor to perform the act.^
Two of the three Montana decisions about the manda­
mus power have cited a fundamental federal constitutional
2case--Marbury v, Madison, Citation of this case by the 
Montana court raises the question how persuasive a federal 
decision should be in a state supreme court, A federal 
decision probably should not be very persuasive on the issue 
of the use of mandamus to compel gubernatorial performance 
of an act since the nature and source of presidential power 
from the federal constitution is fundamentally different
^For an additional discussion of this point see 
notes in 33 Am, Dec. 361 (1839) and 31 Am. St. Rep. 294 (1Ô92), plus 34 Am, Jur,, Mandamus secs. 134, 133»
2l Cranch 137 (1803).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
from the nature and source of gubernatorial power from the 
state constitution « The Montana supreme court failed to 
acknowledge this fundamental difference between the two 
executive functions as it cited the Marbury case for sup­
port of its own decisions,
Montana Decisions 
On three different occasions the Montana supreme 
court has discussed whether the Montana governor in the 
performance of the executive function can be controlled by 
the judiciary through the use of the writ of mandamus. In 
all three cases the issue specifically before the court was 
whether mandamus could be used to compel the governor to 
act, and in two of the three cases the Montana court in 
deciding the issue cited Marbury v, Madison,^
1̂ Cranch 137 (1Ô03), In this famous decision ̂
Chief Justice Marshall defined the distinction between 
discretionary and ministerial acts: "It is said that those
powers which are entrusted to the executive discretion, are 
not subject to the control of judicial authority. They are 
exclusively political. They respect general and not indi­
vidual rights, and, being entrusted to the executive, his 
decision is conclusive. The acts of the secretary of state, 
so far as he is the agent of the executive in the exercise 
of his discretionary powers, are not examinable by the 
courts. But, when the legislature proceeds to impose on 
that officer other duties; when the rights of individuals 
are dependent on the performance of those acts, he is to 
that extent the officer of the law, is amenable to the law 
for his conduct, and can not at his discretion sport away 
the vested rights of others. It is not by the office of the 
person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the 
thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of 
issuing a mandamus is to be determined,"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Cases from the Territorial Period 
The Chumasero Case
Chumasero v. Potts^ held that the governor could be 
compelled by mandamus to perform a ministerial act--to sit 
as a member of a canvassing board to canvass the vote of 
the people when it was his statutory obligation to do so* 
Chumasero, an attorney residing in Helena and an 
elector of the territory, sought a writ of mandamus to issue 
against Governor Potts and other state officers to compel 
them to canvass all the votes of the August 1874 election 
upon the question of removing the seat of the territorial 
government from Virginia City to Helena. The governor 
responded (1) that no one had demanded or requested him to 
conduct the canvass and that there was no default or 
refusal by him to conduct the canvass ; therefore (2) the 
court had no authority to control the action of the execu­
tive by mandamus.
With reference to the governor’s first argument, 
Chief Justice Wade in his majority opinion made a distinc­
tion "between duties of a public nature and those of a 
mere private character," and ruled that in those instances 
involving a public duty "there is no necessity for a demand 
and refusal,"5 «Where the duty is required to be performed
42 Mont. 242 (l8?5), 
^2 Mont. 255.
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by the law and is of a public nature, the law is a suf-
ficient demand, and an omission to perform is a refusal 
Concerning the governor's second argument, Chief 
Justice Wade held "that the execut^^ve may be compelled to 
perform an act clearly ministerial in its nature, and 
neither involves any discretion nor leaves any alterna­
tive."^ Referring to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in 
Marbury v* Madison, Chief Justice Wade stated
. . . the propriety of the writ is not to be
determined by the fact that it is demanded 
against the executive, but by the nature of 
the act required of the executive to perform.
And looking into the nature of the act, we 
say it is purely ministerial, and is absolutely 
defined by the law, and hence that the action
n6
2 Mont, 255• The statute which conferred this duty 
on the governor was a territorial enactment titled "An Act 
to change the seat of government of the Territory of Montana* 
which provided that the canvass of votes on the question of 
changing the seat of government should be conducted in the 
same manner as provided for canvassing the votes for the 
delegate to Congress, The legislation providing for canvas­
sing the congressional delegate's votes was "An Act Relative 
to Elections," section 29 of the Laws of the Territory of 
Montana (1Ô64- .5)» which provided in part : , , , and it
shall be the duty of the secretary of the Territory, with 
the marshall of the Territory or his deputy, in the presence 
of the governor, to proceed within thirty days after the 
election , , , to canvass the votes, , , ,
^2 Mont, 256,
1 Cranch 137 ( 1803 ) » At one point in his opinion,, 
Chief Justice Wade made an analogy between the fact of this 
case and the facts of the Marbury case, and stated that
acts of the commissioners in canvassing the vote
of a ministerial character, like that 
figures or of the issuing of a
elected to an office," 2 Mont
"the
_ were purely
of adding a column of 
commission to an officer duly
256,
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of the executive in this regard may be 
controlled by mandamus,9
Justice Servis, dissenting, thought that a demand 
and default were necessary, and argued that before a writ 
of mandamus could be issued against the governor, there 
must be a demand by the plaintiff and a default by the 
governor. He maintained that since neither demand nor 
default was alleged in the pleadings nor proven, the 
governor could not be compelled to procure and canvass the 
abstract of the votes.
The Tanner Case
1 0Territory ex rel. Tanner v. Potts stated, as 
dictum, that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel the 
governor to audit and allow a claim for expenses and for 
compensation by a person acting as an appointee of the 
governor.
Tanner had been appointed by Governor Potts as a 
"messenger” to arrest and return a fugitive from justice.
He was not successful in his mission and, three years 
later, sought by mandamus to compel the governor to honor 
his claim for expenses incurred while acting as messenger.
Justice Knowles held that Tanner had waited too 
long before bringing his action in mandamus and, therefore.
92 Mont. 256.
^^3 Mont. 364 (1879).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
could not compel the governor to audit and allow the claim 
of expenses. The court, however, stated as dictum that 
the governor in such a case "acts as an auditing officer 
and not in an executive capacity" and, therefore, "an 
application for a writ of mandate to compel him to pro­
ceed and audit a claim for such services and determine to 
his satisfaction how much would be just and reasonable, 
if made in due time, should be entertained." But the court 
could not "dictate to the governor what would be a just 
and reasonable compensation for such services," since "the 
determination of this rests in his discretion."^^
The State Publishing Company Case 
State ex rel. State Publishing Co, v. Sraith^^ held 
that the governor's duty to approve a contract let by the 
board of examiners, on which he sat ex officio, was not 
ministerial but involved discretion.
The state board of examiners, composed of the 
governor and two other elected state executive officers, had 
awarded a printing contract to the State Publishing Company 
subject to approval by the governor and the treasurer; 
however, Governor Smith and the treasurer refused to approve
 ̂̂ 3 Mont, 369.
^^23 Mont, 44, 57 P, 449 (1899).
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i 3the contract» The State Publishing Company maintained 
(1) that the governor's refusal to approve the contract wa; 
arbitrary and without reason, and (2) that the governor's 
duty to approve the contract was purely a ministerial act 
which could be enforced by a writ of mandamus»
Chief Justice Brantly, after reviewing the Chuma­
sero and Tanner cases, held that "the state executive, 
when acting in a ministerial capacity only, and in matters 
not involving executive judgment and discretion, may be 
controlled by this writ »"  ̂̂  However, he did not believe 
that approval in this case was a ministerial act; instead, 
he believed that the governor and the treasurer in the dis 
charge of their duties "must use their judgment and dis­
cretion as to all matters into which the board could or 
should inquire. " The court held that the governor's ace 
was more than ministerial, and could not be controlled by 
mandamus »
^^In the court's opinion, Chief Justice Brantly com­
mented on the strange procedure used by state executive 
officials to approve such contracts: "It may be unfortunate
that the governor was made a member of this board whose duty 
it is to let these contracts » It puts him in a position 
where he can refuse to approve the action of a majority of 
the board of which he is a member, and thus put his veto 
upon proceedings in which he takes part," 23 Mont, 50,
^^23 Mont, 50,
 ̂̂ 23 Mont, 51.
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Summary
The Montana governor, by constitution and statute, 
is invested with certain important executive functions, and 
the performance of these functions depends in part on his 
honesty, judgment and discretion. With reference to those 
functions which are entirely political in nature or require 
the exercise of official judgment or discretion, the Mon­
tana supreme court has consistently held that these execu­
tive functions performed by the governor cannot be con­
trolled by mandamus. However, on the other hand, the Mon­
tana court has held that executive functions or actions 
which are purely ministerial can be controlled by mandamus.
On three early occasions, the territorial or state 
supreme court was asked to reverse, by mandamus, actions 
involving the governor?s executive discretion: to canvass 
results of the election to determine the location of the 
capital; to honor an appointee’s claim for compensation; 
and to award a state contract. In the canvass case, the 
court found a clear "public duty” imposed on the governor 
by statute and awarded the writ. In the compensation case, 
the issue was mooted by a lapse of time, but the court’s 
dictum indicated that mandamus would have issued to compel 
payment of a valid claim that was timely made. In the 
state contract case, the court thought that a curious 
statutory provision providing for gubernatorial review of a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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board decision implied that executive discretion existed 
and denied mandamuse
The territorial court thus established its avail­
ability to review essentially executive decisions of the 
governor and to substitute its own judgment for the 
governor’s as to the difference between ’’ministerial" and 
"discretionary" functions. In addition, the early state 
case, although not awarding mandamus, cited the territorial 
decisions as relevant and possibly persuasivec It must be 
recognized that the determination whether an act is minis­
terial or discretionary is in itself in some measure a 
political decisiono But proper judicial concern for execu­
tive authority implies recognition of this fact and would 
hopefully resolve doubtful instances in favor of executive 
discretion, rather than to award mandamus «
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CHAPTER III
THE POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE 
PUBLIC OFFICERS
This chapter analyzes what the Montana supreme court 
has said about the governor^s exercise of his appointment 
and removal power in creating a body of officials through 
whom he can act. What is the scope of the governor's power 
to appoint to office? What is the scope of the governor^ s 
power to remove appointees? To what extent are these powers 
subject to judicial review?
The Appointment Power
One of the first tasks of the Montana governor after 
taking the oath of office is to create a body of officials 
through whom he can act. This partly consists of selecting 
his personal staff, appointing non-elective department 
heads, and filling vacancies by appointment in the various 
boards and commissions.
The Montana governor's appointment power is founded 
on Article Vll, section 7> of the state constitution:
The governor shall nominate, and by and with 
the consent of the senate, appoint all officers 
whose offices are established by this constitu­
tion, or which may be created by law, and whose
1Ô
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appointment or election is not otherwise 
provided for. . . .1
Within this general constitutional grant of authority,
statutes and judicial decisions further define and limit
the exercise of this appointment power.
The Power to Fill Vacancies
What Constitutes a Vacancy?
The Neill Case.--The Montana supreme court has
twice discussed the governor's appointment power to fill
vacancies, and both times the crucial question was whether
a vacancy existed. An early case, State ex rel. Neill v.
2Page, held that a voluntary resignation before the end of 
an appointee*s term created a vacancy so that the governor 
could make an appointment to fill the vacancy.
On July 31» 1Ô95» the governor appointed Page to be 
state land agent, and on the same day Page was confirmed by 
the state board of land examiners in accordance with a 
statute.̂  Two years later, in 1897» the governor requested 
Page’s resignation which he tendered and the governor 
accepted to take effect on August 7» 1897. On August 9» 
1Ô97, the governor, claiming that there was vacancy,
^Mont, Const., Art. VII, sec. 7.
^20 Mont. 238, 50 P. 719 (1897).
^Mont, Codes Ann. sec. 470 (Booth 1895)» amended 
by 1Ô97 Laws, pp. 104-105.
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appointed Neill but the secretary of state refused to 
countersign Neill^s commission since he believed that 
Neill^ s appointment had to be approved by the state board 
of land examiners.
The court recognized two issues in the case: 
first, whether there was a vacancy created by the gover­
nor * s acceptance of Pagers resignation, and second, if so, 
who had the power to fill the vacancy. With reference to 
the first issue, the court noted a general statutory pro­
vision that resignation would vacate an o f f i c e a n d  ruled 
that a vacancy was created by Page* s voluntary resignation 
and the governor*s acceptance of it. The court held that 
a resignation before the expiration of a term meant **a 
resignation before the end of a fixed time, or before the 
expiration of the time during which an official has the 
right to serve.’*̂
A vacancy existing, the governor could appoint to 
fill it under authority of a statute which provided that :
When any office becomes vacant, and no mode 
is provided by law for filling such vacancy, the
^Mont. Codes Ann., sec. 1101 (Booth 1895). An office becomes vacant on the happening of either of the following events before the expiration of the term:
1 , The death of the incumbent, 2. His insanity, . . ,
3. His resignation. . . .
^20 Mont. 246.
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Governor must fill such vacancy by granting a 
commission to expire at the end of the next 
Legislative Assembly or at the next election 
by the people,o
7The Jardine Case.--State ex rel. Jardine v. Ford, 
held that a voluntary retirement had the same effect as a 
resignation, and thereby created a vacancy to be filled by 
the governor.
On December 31, 1947» Judge Ewing, who had been 
elected to a four-year term as district judge, notified 
the governor that he was retiring at midnight that night. 
In contemplation of the judge’s retirement, the governor 
requested an advisory opinion from the attorney general 
whether there would be a vacancy in the office of district 
judge upon Judge Ewing’s retirement. The attorney general 
advised the governor that either of two statutory provi­
sions might govern the situation: one concerning ’’resigna­
tion,” and the other concerning the judge’s ’’ceasing to
àdischarge the duty of his office,” The attorney general
^ o n t . Codes Ann., sec. 1104 (Booth 1Ô95)* This 
statute remains in effect as Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 59-605 
(1947).
*̂ 120 Mont. 507» 188 P.2d 422 (1948) .
^Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 511 (1935). This statute 
provided that ’’An office becomes vacant on the happening 
of either of the following events before the expiration of 
the terra:” death, insanity, ”3. His resignation," removal, 
non-residency, absence from the state, ”7. His ceasing to 
discharge the duty of his office for the period of three 
consecutive months, except when prevented by sickness, or
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concluded that unless Judge Ewing gave the governor "his 
resignation . » , the office will not be vacant until three 
consecutive months have elapsed in which he has refrained 
from discharging the duty of his office, unless prevented 
from discharging his duty by sickness.”^
The supreme court did not accept the attorney 
general * s strict interpretation of the statutory provision 
Instead, the court reasoned that: (1) since the judge had 
properly notified the governor of his retirement, (2) since 
he was entitled to receive a retirement allowance under the 
retirement system, and (3) since he would not be paid for 
any further services rendered to the state after his retire­
ment, the judge had voluntarily exercised his right to 
retire which thereby created a vacancy. In other words, 
the court chose not to distinguish between "resignation" 
and "retirement" and ruled that the statutory provision-- 
section $11--was not exclusive so that events other than 
those enumerated in the section could also create a vacancy« 
The court maintained that a vacancy arises whenever an 
office is unoccupied by an incumbent who has a legal right
when absent from the state by permission of the legislative 
assembly," conviction of a felony, refusal or neglect to 
file his oath or bond, or a void election.
20 Mont. 510, The decision specifically states 
that the quoted passage was part of the attorney générales 
opinion; however, the opinion does not appear in 22 Op. 
Atty. Gen. (1947-48).
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to continue In the office.
Having established that there was a vacancy created 
by the judge^s retirement, the court held that the governor 
had constitutional authority to fill the vacancy; it cited 
Article Vlll, section 34, of the Montana constitution: 
"Vacancies in the office of . . . judge of the district 
court . . . shall be filled by appointment, by the governor 
of the state. , .
Length of the Appointee^s Tei-m
General.-“The general rule in state government 
where an individual has been appointed to a newly created 
elective office is that the appointee’s term lasts only 
until the next general election.^ ̂  This rule became estab­
lished in Montana when the Montana supreme court decided
11in State ex rel. Patterson v. Lentz that a district judge 
appointed to a newly created judgeship could serve only 
until the next general biennial election, and not until the 
next quadrennial election at which the district judges 
generally were to be elected. The case involved an apparent 
conflict between the clearly stated intent of a statute, and 
a constitutional provision of general import. The court 
gave a literal construction to the constitutional provision
^^42 Am, Jur., Public Officers, sec. 142. 
^^30 Mont. 322, 146 P. 932 (1915).
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to terminate the duration of the gubernatorial appointment 
before the time specified by the legislature*
The Patterson Case.— In 1913» the legislature 
created an additional judgeship in the fourth judicial dis­
trict and authorized the governor to appoint a judge who 
would serve until after the second subsequent general 
biennial election in November 1916.^^ In accordance with 
this legislation the governor appointed Patterson to this 
judgeship and gave him a commission stating that he was to 
hold the judgeship until the first Monday in January 1917. 
The legislature^s intent appears to have been to have the 
term of the new judgeship coincide with the quadrennial 
term of other district judges elected in presidential elec­
tion years;
This legislative intent appeared to conflict with 
Article VIII, section 34, of the Montana constitution, which 
provided that vacancies in district judgeships would be 
filled by appointment "until the next general election and 
until his successor is elected and qualified."^ ̂
^^1913 Laws, c. 14, p. 14. Section 2 of the act provided: "The governor shall appoint some fit and quali­fied person as additional judge of the said fourth judicial district to hold his office until the first Monday of 
January, 1917, or until his successor is duly elected and qualifi ed."
1 •̂ Mont. Const., Art. VIII, sec. 34. Vacancies in the office of . . . judge of the district court . , . shall be filled by appointment, by the governor of the state. . . 
A person appointed to fill any such vacancy shall hold
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Patterson argued that this constitutional provision 
should be construed to read "until the next general 
(judicial) election"; that is, that such elections were 
quadrennial. Thus Patterson claimed that his appointment 
was valid until a successor was elected in the November 
1916 election.
The court chose the view that "next general elec­
tion" meant the next biennial election to be held in 
November 1914. The court's ruling placed heavy emphasis on 
the last two sentences of Article VIII, section 34, and 
concluded that Patterson's appointment was valid only un­
til the next general election and, therefore, the governor 
in his commission to Patterson could not extend the 
appointee's term beyond the next general biennial election.
Summary
The Montana supreme court in both the Neill and 
Jardine cases has ruled that a vacancy exists in an office 
whenever the office is empty and without an incumbent who 
has a right to the office. In addition in both cases, the 
court held that the vacancy in question should be filled by 
the governor.
In the Neill decision, the court with statutory
office until the next general election and until his succes­
sor is elected and qualified. A person elected to fill a 
vacancy shall hold office until the expiration of the terra 
for which the person he succeeds was elected.
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direction held that an appointee*s voluntary resignation 
and its acceptance by the governor created a vacancy within 
the office. Section 1101 presented the court with clear 
authority to hold that the acceptance of the resignation 
by the governor left the office empty and without an incum­
bent and thereby created a vacancy.
The Neill decision affirms the statutory appoint­
ment power vested in the governor, and to the extent that 
it has affirmed this statutory power, the decision has 
strengthened the appointment power of the governor.
Since the statute presented clear direction for the 
court to render this decision, the court was unable to 
exercise a mode of interpretation in the absence of a prima 
facie constitutional or statutory clarity.
In the Jardine decision, the court was given slight 
assistance by section 511 which enumerated ten contingen­
cies that would cause a vacancy. Consequently, since the 
court lacked any clear constitutional or statutory direction 
regarding the issue of vacancy, it exercised a mode of 
interpretation when it held that section 511 was not exclu­
sive , and thereby provided that other contingencies such 
as retirement could cause a vacancy. The court’s exercise 
of this mode of interpretation has strengthened the gover­
nor’s appointment power and, consequently, becomes a case 
in point to prove the hypothesis of this study. In choosing
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not to distinguish between "resignation" and "retirement 
the court exercised a mode of interpretation creating a 
vacancy, and thereby providing the governor with an oppor­
tunity to exercise his appointment power*
The Patterson decision was also rendered with 
little clear statutory or constitutional direction* The 
legislation on the one hand said the length of the 
appointee*s term would last until January 1917, whereas the 
constitution provided that the term should last only until 
the next general election* Consequently, the court looked 
to past decisions for the policy that appointments to fill 
vacancies in elective offices were to remain in effect only 
until the people could act through an election*
This decision does not focus on the governor* s 
appointment power per se; instead, it focuses on the term 
of the gubernatorial appointee who is appointed to an elec­
tive office* The decision held that the length of a guber­
natorial appointee’s term to an elective office is only 
until the next biennial election*
Although the court did rely on precedent and did 
partially exercise a mode of judicial interpretation in 
reaching its decision, this is not a proper case to prove 
or disprove the study’s hypothesis since the vacancy to be 
filled was an elective office and not an appointive office* 
With reference to elective offices, it seems proper that
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any appointment should only last until the people $ at the 
earliest opportunity, can fill the vacancy by election in 
accordance with the constitution, irrespective of what 
specific legislation may provide.
The Power to Make Interim 
Appointments
General
The focus of this study now shifts to those in­
stances where the governor has the power to make an appoint­
ment after the confirming body has adjourned. These 
appointments are often called ”recess" appointments, even 
in the Montana constitution. Nonetheless, a more accurate 
description would be "interim” appointments. The source 
of this power for the Montana governor is Article VII, 
section 7, of the Montana constitution which provides:
The governor shall nominate, and by and 
with the consent of the senate, appoint all 
officers whose offices are established by this 
constitution, or which may be created by law, 
and whose appointment or election is not other­
wise provided for. If during the recess of the 
senate a vacancy occur in any such office, the 
governor shall appoint some fit person to dis­
charge the duties thereof until the next meeting 
of the senate, when he shall nominate some per­
son to fill such office
Generally, the appointing power may, after adjourn­
ment by the confirming body, fill a vacancy which has 
occurred since the adjournment. However, the vacancy must 
occur after the adjournment; a governor may not, after
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adjournment by the senate or confirming body, fill a vacancy
that existed while that body was in session.
The three previous cases in this chapter were cases 
where the governor has the power to appoint without the need 
of a confirming body. Two cases present issues concerning 
the governor*s power to make appointments requiring confir­
mation during the time the confirming body is not in session. 
The issue of what constitutes a vacancy becomes even more 
important since the governor cannot make an interim appoint­
ment unless a vacancy exists*
The Nagle Case.— In State ex rel, Nagle v. Staf­
ford, the Montana supreme court held that no vacancy ex­
isted in an office when a holdover appointee could still
perform the duties of the office.
On April 5, 1919, the governor appointed Stafford 
to be commissioner of agriculture for a term ending 
April 1, 1933* In 1931, the senate confirmed the 
appointment in accordance with Article XVIII, section 1, 
of the Montana constitution,^^ and statutory section
^^30 Am. Jur. 2d 937, Governor sec. 7 {I960).
1^97 Mont. 275, 34 P.2d 372 (1934).
^^Mont. Const., Art. XVIII, sec. 1. The legislative assembly may provide for a bureau of agriculture, labor and industry, to be located at the capital and be under the con­trol of a commissioner appointed by the governor subject to the confirmation of the senate. The commissioner shall hold 
his office for four years, and until his successor is ap­pointed and qualified; his compensation shall be as provided 
by law.
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3556.^'^ On March 13, 1933, the governor reappointed Staf­
ford to the office for another four-year ternio On the same 
day, the governor resigned. Later, on November 27, 1933, 
the acting governor called a special session of the legis­
lature ; during that special session, Stafford* s appoint­
ment was presented to the senate which failed to confirm 
it. After the special session was over, the acting governor 
attempted, on February 1, 1934, to appoint Bruce to be com­
missioner of agriculture. Thus the facts created this issue? 
whether a vacancy existed in the office of commissioner of 
agriculture so that the acting governor could appoint Bruce 
to fill the vacancy until the legislature was back in 
session.
By taking into consideration the special provision 
of the constitution— Article XVIII, section 1--the supreme 
court held that Stafford had the right to serve, as a hold­
over appointee, under his original confirmed appointment 
until his successor was appointed, confirmed and qualified. 
In other words, the court ruled that there was no vacancy 
in the office since there was still someone in the office
17Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 3556 (1921). The chief executive officer of the department of agriculture, labor, 
and industry, hereinafter referred to as the commissioner of agriculture, shall be a commissioner of agriculture, to be appointed by the governor, by and with the consent of the senate, and such commissioner shall hold office for a term of four years or until his successor is appointed and 
qualified.
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who could discharge the duties of the office. Thus the 
acting governor could not exercise his interim appointment 
power.
1 ÔThe Olsen Case.--State ex rel. Olsen v. Swanberg 
again held that no vacancy existed in an appointive office 
because the confirmed holdover appointee had better title 
to the office then the non-confirmed replacement appointee.
On December 29, 1952, Swanberg was appointed by the 
governor and later confirmed to be chairman of the indus­
trial accident board to fill a term expiring on May 1, 1955- 
On April 29, 1955, the governor appointed McChesney to re­
place Swanberg as chairman for a four-year term expiring 
May 1, 1959- At the time of McChesney's appointment, the 
legislature was not in session, hence McChesney's appoint­
ment had not been referred to the senate for confirmation.
The governor's power to make the appointment was 
derived from section 92-104.  ̂̂  This section clearly stated 
that the governor's appointments to the board must be con­
firmed "by and with the consent of the senate." The issue
1^130 Mont. 202, 299 P.2d 466 (1956).
^^Mont, Rev. Codes, sec. 92-104 (1947), as amended 
by 1953 Laws, c. l6l, pp. 213-314. There is hereby created 
a board to consist of three (3) members. . . . and one mem­
ber shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the con­
sent of the senate. . . . The term of office of the appointed 
member of the board shall be four (4) years and until his 
successor shall have been appointed and confirmed.
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thus became whether the clear constitutional and statutory 
directive for filling the office with a confirmed appointee 
should prevail over the statement providing for a four- 
year term,
McChesney argued that a vacancy existed in the 
office upon the expiration of Swanberg*s term, and that 
this vacancy occurred during a senate adjournment thereby 
authorizing a gubernatorial appointment in accordance with 
Article VII, section 7, of the Montana constitution. How­
ever, Justice Forrest Anderson speaking for the court ruled 
that this provision in the constitution "has reference only 
to such vacancies which leave the office without anyone to 
discharge the duties and does not apply to a case where the 
incumbent holds until his successor is elected or appointed
20and qualified and is discharging the duties of his office," 
Justice Anderson’s opinion distinguished between a non­
confirmed successor and a previously confirmed appointee and 
held that until successors are confirmed by the senate, a 
previously confirmed appointee is entitled to hold over in 
the office. Justice Anderson concluded therefore that Swan­
berg upon serving his four-year term could continue to hold 
the office as a previously confirmed appointee until his 
successor had been appointed, qualified and confirmed.
2^130 Mont. 205
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Summary
Both the Nagle and Olsen decisions by the Montana 
supreme court have affected the implementation of the 
governor's constitutionally defined interim appointment 
power. The court in these two decisions has exercised a 
restrictive mode of interpretation concerning the word 
"vacancy" which, when a previously confirmed appointee 
remains able to perform his duties, prohibits the governor 
from making any interim appointments which would require 
confirmation when the confirming body is not in session.
An obvious result of these decisions is that (1) if a newly 
elected governor fails to make all his appointments re­
quiring confirmation in the first two months of his admin­
istration while the confirming body is in session, and 
(2) if the statute provides for a definite term "and until 
his successor is appointed and confirmed," the governor 
will have to wait 22 months before confirmation can be ob­
tained, during which time he must guide his administration 
with some of the previous governor’s appointees. This kind 
of a result is categorically bad and undesirable.
Every governor should have "his team" during his 
administration, and state supreme courts through their 
decisions should attempt to achieve this result when they 
are not bound by the constitution or statutes to do other­
wise. It can be argued that in the Olsen case, the Montana
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court was bound by legislation which provided that the con­
firmed appointee should holdover "until his successor was 
appointed and confirmed." However, this does not excuse 
the court from its holding in the Nagle case, since the 
statute in that case simply required that the appointee be 
"appointed and qualified." The word "qualified" usually 
has meant meeting basic bonding requirements, and nothing 
more. Thus it would appear that in the Nagle case the court 
could have easily held that once the appointee satisfied 
the bonding requirements he was qualified to assume the 
interim appointment.
The effect of these two decisions is to allow a 
holdover appointee to remain in office beyond his term un­
til the non-confirmed appointee is confirmed, when the 
spirit of Article VII, section 7, of the Montana constitu­
tion seems to provide that the governor can make an interim 
appointment until the confirming body comes back into 
session. In other words, the effect of these two decisions 
has weakened the Montana governor*s interim appointment 
power. In the Nagle case, the inheritor of the primary 
blame for this weakened power is the court since it placed 
an improper emphasis and definition on the word "qualified," 
whereas, in the Olsen case, only the secondary blame falls 
on the court for the weakened power since legislation 
existed udiich had already weakened this appointment power.
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For the purposes of this study it can be concluded that in 
the Nagle case, the court, in the presence of clear con­
stitutional and statutory direction favoring an interim 
appointment, weakened the governor’s power, whereas, in 
the Olsen case, the court, in the presence of clear statu­
tory direction opposing an interim appointment, also 
weakened the governor’s power.
Abuse of the Appointment Power
The Cutts Case
The Montana supreme court was once presented with
the issue of whether the governor possessed the authority
to make an appointment to fill a legislative vacancy.
21State ex rel. Cutts v. Hart held that the governor did 
not have the authority to fill by appointment the legis­
lative vacancy created by death of a member of the Montana 
house of representatives when the constitution expressly 
contemplated a special election for that purpose. On 
February 7, 1917» in the midst of the 60-day legislative 
session, the governor appointed Cutts to fill the unexpired 
term of the deceased representative.
The court noted that since Article V, section 45,
21 56 Mont. 571, 1Ô5 P. 769 (1919).
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p pof the Montana constitution provided that the only way 
in which to fill a vacancy caused by death was for the 
governor to issue writs of election. The people had "re­
tained in themselves, and in themselves alone, the power 
to fill vacancies in the legislative b o d i e s . T h u s ,  
the court held that the governor's appointment of Cutts 
was made contrary to the Constitution.
Summary
The Cutts decision was based on a clear consti­
tutional provision which directed the governor to issue 
writs of election--not to make an appointment. The 
governor abused his constitutional appointment power when 
he appointed Cutts contrary to Article V, section 45.
Article V, section 45j may have been both imprac­
ticable and unrealistic in that it would take too long to 
implement. If a vacancy occurred while the 60-day legis­
lature was in session, as in the Cutts case, the process 
of election could occupy most of the session by the time 
the special election was held. Valuable legislative time 
would have passed leaving the people in the legislative
^^Mont. Const,, Art. V, sec. 45* When vacancies 
occur in either house, the governor or the person exer­
cising the functions of the governor shall issue writs 
of election to fill the same.
2356 Mont, 574.
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district without complete representation.
In 1932, Article V, section 45, was amended in an 
effort to correct this deficiency. Legislative vacancies 
by death were expressly excepted from this provision for 
special election and the county commissioners were author­
ized to appoint to fill legislative vacancies. The entire 
constitutional provision was repealed in 1966 as an inci­
dent of legislative reapportionment, leaving in force an 
early statute which had echoed the original constitutional 
provision. Once again the vacancies are to be filled by 
special election. This repeal failed to resolve the prob­
lem which still exists: the valuable loss of legislative 
time and the lack of representation of electors in the dis­
trict during the implementation of the special election.
The Cutts case neither proves nor disproves the 
hypothesis of this study. The categorical constitutional 
provision left the court no room to exercise an indepen­
dent mode of interpretation.
The Removal Power
Removal from Office Where Term Is Not Fixed
In State ex rel, Bonner v. District C o u r t , t h e  
Montana court held that a gubernatorial appointee, who holds 
a public office whose term or duration is not fixed by law,
^^122 Mont, 464, 206 P.2d 166 (1949).
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holds the office at the pleasure and will of the governoro 
On May 6, 1937, Governor Ayers appointed Craighead 
to be chairman of the unemployment compensation commission^ 
and for the next 12 years Craighead remained as chairman 
of the commission. Following the sine die adjournment of 
the legislature, Governor Bonner on March 28, 1949» in­
formed Craighead that his services would not be needed 
after March 31 » upon which day he appointed Stewart to be 
chairman. On April 1, Craighead sought an injunction 
against Stewart and Governor Bonner to restrain them from 
interfering with his duties as chairman. The sole question 
before the court was who was entitled to hold and exercise 
the chairmanship of the commission.
One Montana statute provided that the chairman of 
the commission was to be paid a full-time salary, without 
providing for a fixed terra of o f f i c e . I n  addition, 
another statute provided that "every office of which the 
duration is not fixed by law is held at the pleasure of the 
appointing power.
Chief Justice Adair, speaking for the majority,
25i937 Laws, c. 137, sec. 10(a), p. 439» . . . The
third member of the commission, who shall be designated as 
chairman at the time of his appointment, shall be paid a 
full-time salary in an amount to be fixed by the governor 
and shall be the executive director,
26Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 422 (1935)
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noted the general rule concerning the holding of a public 
office whose term is not fixed by law was that in the 
absence of constitutional restrictions, "the power to 
appoint an officer carries with it the power to remove at 
the pleasure of the appointing power, where the appoint­
ment is not for a fixed term."^^ After observing that the 
unemployment compensation law failed to create a fixed 
term for the chairman, and in view of section 422, the 
chief justice held that, "As the duration of his office is 
not fixed by law, ^raighea^7 held at the pleasure of that
p àGovernor," and therefore could be removed by the governor 
at his will.
Justice Angstman dissented, arguing that section 
10(a) of the law provided for the creation of the commis­
sion and that it "shall consist of three members who shall 
be appointed by the governor on a non-partisan merit 
b a s i s , a n d  therefore required that under the merit 
system there could be no removal at the mere will of the 
appointing power.
The phrase "non-partisan merit basis" has 
acquired a distinct and well known meaning. Once
*̂̂ See annotation in 119 ALR 1437, as quoted in 
122 Mont. 471 .
2^122 Mont. 482.
29i937 Laws, c. 137, sec. 10(a), p. 439.
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an appointment is made under it, removal can be accomplished only for cause and not upon personal considerations.^^
In addition he argued that section 422 could have
no application to one appointed under the merit system.
Thus he concluded that persons appointed under the merit
system could not be discharged except for cause.
As to appointments made by the governor on a merit basis, he can adopt such reasonable method as he sees fit in determining the fitness of applicants. Once he makes an appointment. removal can be accomplished only for cause,3i
Removal "for Cause**
The gubernatorial power to appoint to public office 
carries with it the power to remove, in the absence of con­
stitutional or statutory restraint. In Montana, the courts 
have held that a constitutional or statutory provision for 
appointment for a fixed term constitutes such a restraint 
and, in the absence of any provision for summary removal, 
one who is appointed for a fixed term can be removed only 
**for cause.” This phrase "for cause” has generally meant 
removal for reasons which law and sound public policy have 
recognized as sufficient to justify removal. The Montana 
supreme court, on three different occasions, has been 
called upon to decide what constitutes removal "for cause,"
3O122 Mont, 485, 486, 
3^122 Mont, 490, 491.
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The Sullivan Case
State ex. rel. Nagle v. Sullivan^^ held that the
phrase ^̂ for cause” means that the governor must give notice
to the appointed officer and provide him with a hearing or
opportunity to be heard in his defense.
Governor Erickson appointed Sullivan, Flynn and
Steinbrenner to the state fish and game commission for fixed
terms, and then himself resigned. A year later, the acting
governor revoked their appointments "for the good of the
commission," and in their place appointed Baumgartner,
Gutensohn and Harper. A statute fixed the term of service
on the commission at "four years, unless sooner removed"
and further provided that the governor had the power to
fill all vacancies and "to remove any member of said com-
33mission for cause or for the good of the commission," 
Sullivan claimed that the attempted removal was void on the 
ground that "the action was taken without notice, hearing
3290 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d 995 (1935).
^^Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 3561 (1921), The members 
of the commission hereby created shall be appointed by the 
governor of the state of Montana. . . . Two of said members 
shall be appointed to serve for one year, one to serve two 
years, one to serve three years, and one to serve four 
years, and thereafter to be appointed by the governor at 
the expiration of their first terms, to serve for four years 
unless sooner removed. All vacancies in the commission 
shall be filled by the governor. The governor is hereby 
given the power to remove any member of said commission 
for cause or for the good of the commission.
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or opportunity to be h e a r d " w h i l e  Baumgartner alleged 
that certain matters existed giving legal cause for removal, 
and further claimed that requirements of notice and a hear­
ing were not necessary. The sole issue before the court 
was whether the governor had the authority to remove Sulli­
van without notice, hearing or opportunity to be heard.
The majority of the court held that:
When a statute provides for an appointment for a 
definite term of office, without provision other­
wise, or provides for removal "for cause," with­
out qualification, removal may be effected only 
after notice has been given to the officer of the 
charges made against him and he has been given an 
opportunity to be heard in his defense.35
Thus, the court ordered that the governor could remove 
Sullivan only after he had received notice and had been 
given an opportunity to be heard in his defense. It may be 
noted that the majority based its decision on the statutory 
phrase of removal "for cause," while the governor had ex­
pressly rested his removal order on the statutory ground 
that it was "for the good of the commission."
Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion agreed with
the majority that any removal "for cause" required notice
and a hearing for the appointee. However, he stated that
the issues had become
confused to such an extent that the reasons for 
the action of the Governor /had7 been entirely
349g Mont. 436. 
^^98 Mont. 439.
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shifted from the broad ground of "for the good 
of the commission" to the specific charges of 
wrongdoing, or malfeasance and misfeasance inoffice.36
Justice Stewart argued that had the case proceeded solely 
upon the general grounds originally stated by the governor 
without the injection of the specific grounds the governor 
would have had the authority "to remove a commissioner 
without notice or hearing when it is done for the good of 
the commission— for the better administration of the affairs 
of the department
The dissent by Justice Angstman urged that where 
"the statute simply states that an officer may be removed 
’for cause’ without any qualifying words and without speci­
fying what constitutes ’cause,’ the removing power has 
authority to determine what shall constitute cause, as well 
as to determine whether that cause e x i s t s . J u s t i c e  
Angstman argued that the legislative intent should govern 
whether notice and a hearing were requisite before the 
governor could remove a commissioner. To determine this 
intent he reviewed similar legislative enactments of the 
1921 Montana legislative assembly. His review illustrated 
that in "some cases notice and hearing are essential, In
369g Mont. 446. 
37qg Mont. 446, 
3Ô9Ô Mont. 447.
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others not; and this is true whether the tenure is for a
fixed term or o t h e r w i s e F r o m  this analysis he argued
that "there was no thought on the part of that assembly
that an officer could not be removed for cause without
first giving notice and holding a hearing, except in those
cases where notice and hearing were specifically provided
f o r T h e  justice concluded that the removal power of
the governor was discretionary, and could be exercised
without notice or hearing. For additional support he
cited an Oklahoma case which held:
An appointee to such a position is selected by 
the chief executive for the purpose of aiding 
the executive in carrying out his sense of 
duties and responsibilities to the public and 
with the belief that such appointee will work 
in harmony with and aid the Governor in ful­
filling his sense of duty to the public. It is 
the Governor, the chief executive, who is held 
responsible to the sovereignty for errohs in 
his executive and administrative policies. The 
appointee is responsible to the chief executive, 
and in the absence of express authority, the 
judiciary has nothing to do with the chief 
executive's judgment, conscience, sense of 
duty, or responsibilities.41
The Holt Case
The second Montana supreme court decision concerning 
the authority of the governor to remove appointees "for
3998 Mont, 450.
Mont. 450.
41Bynum v. Strain, 95 Okla. 45, 218 P. 883 (1923), 
as quoted in 98 Mont. 451.
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cause” was State ex rel. Holt v. District Court^^ which held 
that the phrase ”for cause" meant not only that the governor 
must provide notice and a hearing, but also must hear all 
evidence offered in defense by the appointee relating to 
his good faith.
Acting Governor Holt, on October 26, 1936, charged 
that the three members of the state highway commission had 
illegally drawn state funds and issued a notice to the com­
missioners to appear before him to show cause, if they had 
any, why they should not be removed. The commissioners 
appeared and admitted receipt of the funds, but asserted 
that they were received legally and that they had acted in 
good faith. They said that when they were informed that 
the receipt of the funds was illegal, they refrained from 
drawing further funds. They also alleged that, by reason 
of certain political activities, the governor "was biased 
and prejudiced against them and therefore not a proper 
person to try them on these accusations,"^^
The governor showed that the funds received by the 
commissioners Were for per diem and mileage claimed by the 
commissioners at times when the commission was not in 
session. When the commissioners admitted to this evidence.
42io3 Mont. 43^, 63 P,2d 1026 (1936), 
^3103 Mont. 441.
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the governor concluded that there was no necessity to hear 
further evidence, and issued orders removing the commis­
sioners from the commission.
Montana law created the highway commission and pro­
vided that its three members should "be appointed by the 
governor," to "hold office for the term of four years and 
until his successor is appointed and qual i f i e d . A n o t h e r  
statute further provided that "the members of the state 
highway commission shall be appointed by the governor and 
may be removed by him at any time for c a u s e . "^5
The majority opinion referred to the Sullivan case 
which had held that removal "for cause," without qualifi­
cation, means that removal "may be effected only after 
notice has been given to the officer of the charges made 
against him and he has been given an opportunity to be
^^Mont. Rev, Codes, sec, 1763 (1935). There is hereby created a commission to be known as the state high­way commission to consist of three members to be appointed 
by the governor, , . ,Each commissioner shall hold office for the term of four years and until his successor is appointed and qualified and shall receive as compensation . . , the sum of ten dollars ($10,00) per diem for each day actually en­gaged in the duties of his office, including his time of travel between his home and his place of employment of such duties, together with his traveling expenses while away from his home in the performance of the duties of his 
office. , , .
45Mont, Rev. Codes, sec. 1764 (1935). The members 
of the state highway commission shall be appointed by the 
governor and may be removed by him at any time for 
cause, . , ,
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heard in his d e f e n s e . T h e  majority perceived the pri­
mary issue to be whether the hearing before the governor 
was "such a hearing as was contemplated under the rules 
set forth in the Sullivan c a s e , "47 which had held that 
removal "for cause" had to be in accordance with the pub­
lic policy of the state which required notice and a hear­
ing. In accordance with these rules, the majority stated 
that "it was the duty of the governor to hear the evidence 
which might be offered in support of the defense of good 
faith.
With reference to the commissioners* other defense, 
that of the governor*s prejudice, the majority held that 
there was no provision for the disqualification of the 
governor and, therefore, in accordance with the law, the 
governor had the exclusive jurisdiction over the commis­
sioners* removal.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Morris, 
began by stating:
The Governor, as the executive head of the 
state government, is vested with broad discretion­
ary powers and the majority opinion creates a 
dangerous precedent by unreasonably restricting 
such discretionary powers in the removal by the
46state ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 9Ô Mont, 425» 
439, as quoted in 103 Mont. 444•
^7io3 Mont. 444.
4^103 Mont. 446.
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executive of members of his official family, his 
appointees. . , . Upon the governor practically 
alone rests the responsibility of the credi­
bility of his administration, and to deny him 
the practical control of his appointees, par­
ticularly in the expenditure of public funds, 
goes a long way towards the destruction of the 
right to hold the t̂ hief Executive responsible 
for the efficient administration of a government 
of which he is the head and which was one of the 
chief purposes of having a single individual the 
executive head of the government.^9
Justice Morris, in further support of his opinion, then 
cited a short part of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Taft^ s majority opinion of the Myers case which broadly 
defined the president * s removal power over inferior execu­
tive appointees.
The vesting of the executive power in the 
President was essentially a grant of the power to 
execute the laws. But the President alone and 
unaided could not execute the laws. He must exe­
cute them by the assistance of subordinates. . . ,
As he is charged specifically to take care that 
they be faithfully executed, the reasonable impli­
cation, even in the absence of express words, was 
that as part of his executive power he should select 
those who were to act for him, . , , The further 
implication must be, in the absence of any express 
limitation respecting removals, that as his selec­
tion of administrative officers is essential to the 
execution of the laws by him, so must be his power 
of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be
responsible.50
Justice Morris argued that the same reasoning applies to the 
chief executive of a state as to the chief executive of a
49103 Mont. 449, 450.
^^yers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 25, 
71 L.Ed. 160, 166 (1926), as quoted in IO3 Mont. 450.
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nation. In addition, he questioned the purpose of the 
governor* s having to hear the defenses of good faith since 
the governor, after the defenses, still possessed sole 
discretionary power to remove the commissioners.
The Matson Case
State ex rel. Matson v. 0*Hern^^ held that, once 
the governor provided the appointees with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard to present their defense, the 
governor had the power to remove executive appointees "for 
cause,” This case was a continuation of the Holt case in 
which the court had held that removal "for cause" meant that 
the governor must provide notice and a hearing so that the 
appointee can present his defense. The Matson case went 
one step further, with the same facts, and held that after 
the governor had given notice and an opportunity for the 
appointee to present his defense he had discretionary power 
to remove the executive appointee.
After the Holt decision, the acting governor did 
provide the commissioners with notice and an opportunity to 
present their defenses. Upon completion of this hearing, 
the governor removed the commissioners in accordance with 
section 1704.^^
5"* 104 Mont. 126, 65 P.2d 619 (1937)- 
52Mont. Rev, Codes, sec. 1784 (1935)»
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart 
who had concurred in the Sullivan case, noted that the 
Montana constitution provides that "all officers not liable 
to impeachment shall be subject to removal for misconduct 
or malfeasance in office, in such manner as may be provided 
by law."^^ He noted the statutory provision upon which the 
governor acted which stated: "The members of the state
highway commission shall be appointed by the governor and 
may be removed by him at any time for c a u s e . I n  dis­
charging his executive duties, the court maintained that 
the governor acted not only under the authority of the 
statute which gave him power to remove the appointees, but 
also under the state constitution. Viewing the Montana law, 
the majority concluded that the governor had the power to 
remove the commissioners, and held that "the powers here 
reposed in him and exercised by him in this proceeding are 
of a discretionary character, and that his action could be 
subject to our review only if it should clearly appear from 
the record that he acted with no facts to move his dis­
cretion."^5 Thus, the court held that the grant of the
53Mont. Const., Art. VII, sec. 7» 
3^Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 17Ô4 (1935)« 
55104 Mont. 150.
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removal power to the executive to remove "for cause" im­
plies that the executive has the authority to judge what 
constitutes cause for removal, but qualified this by hold­
ing that there must be sufficient facts to move his dis­
cretion.
The dissenting opinion was written by Justice 
Angstman who had also written the dissenting opinion in 
the Sullivan case. It will be remembered that in the Sul­
livan dissent Justice Angstman had written that the 
governor's removal power was discretionary and, therefore, 
the power of removal could be exercised by the governor 
without providing notice and a hearing to the appointee. 
However, in the Matson case. Justice Angstman's dissenting 
opinion was based on the majority opinion of the Sullivan 
case, which had held that the governor must provide notice 
and a hearing where the removal is "for cause," and con­
cluded that in the Matson case there was no evidence to 
support the order of removal. In other words. Justice 
Angstman argued that the Sullivan case required a showing 
of cause before the governor could remove an appointee, 
and that in this case there was no showing of cause, since 
there was no showing of bad faith by the appointee. In 
effect, Justice Angstman accepted the majority opinion in 
the Sullivan case and then rigidly applied it to dissent 
in this case maintaining that, since there was no showing
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of bad faith so as to constitute cause for removal, the 
commissioners could not be removed.
Summary
In 1949, in the Craighead c a s e t h e  Montana 
supreme court held that a gubernatorial appointee, who 
holds a public office whose term or duration is not fixed 
by law, holds the office at the pleasure and will of the 
governor. This decision is consistent with the study*s 
hypothesis since (1) it was rendered in the absence of 
clear constitutional or statutory direction and since 
(2) it strengthens the Montana governorship by allowing the 
governor to remove such appointees at his will. Unfor­
tunately, the three earlier removal decisions failed to 
accomplish this desirable result.
The first of the three earlier unfortunate deci­
sions rendered by the Montana supreme court was the 1935 
Sullivan decision in which the court exercised a mode of 
interpretation which held that the governor could not re­
move executive appointees "for cause" unless and until he 
had provided the appointee with notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. This case, a bad precedent, served as a 
foundation for two more cases which further weakened the 
removal power of the executive. From the beginning of this
^^State ex rel. Bonner v. District Court, 122 Mont 
464 (1949).
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series of three unfortunate cases, it appears that the 
court perceived the executive appointees to have an un­
defined property right in the appointed office and that 
the appointee could not be removed until after the governor 
had acted according to judicial due process. The better 
mode on interpretation, in the absence of clear consti­
tutional or statutory direction, would have held that an 
appointee has no right in an appointed executive office, 
except at the pleasure of the governor.
The Sullivan case held that the governor must give 
notice and a hearing. From this decision, the court held 
in the 1936 Holt case that not only must the governor give 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, but also that he 
must allow the appointee to present all his evidence proving 
good faith. Up until the Holt case, the court had weakened 
the governor* s removal power by imposing two procedural 
requirements: notice and a hearing; in the Holt case the 
majority went one step further to weaken his powers by im­
posing an additional procedural and substantive require­
ment— requiring the governor to hear all evidence offered 
in defense by the appointee regarding his good faith.
From these two precedents, the majority in the 1937 
Matson case held that the governor could in fact remove 
the executive appointees, if he had adhered to the require­
ments laid dovm in the Holt case. The total effect of
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these decisions is to prohibit the governor from removing 
executive appointees until after he has; (1) given notice 
to the appointee, (2) provided the appointee with an oppor­
tunity to be heard, and (3) heard the good faith defenses 
of the appointee.
Such needless restrictions on the governor’s dis­
cretionary removal power: (1) limit the removal power of
the governor, (2) weaken the executive function of the 
governor, and (3) increase the difficulty of achieving a 
responsible and efficient state executive. The best 
interests of a strong and responsible state executive could
have been advanced in Montana had the court followed the
dissenting opinion in the Holt case.
It is ironic that the majority opinion in the 
Matson case stated
. . . the members of the judiciary can only be
drawn from a class or profession whose duty and
pride it is to study and understand governmental 
principles and their practical application. . . .
All of this presupposes more than ordinary under­
standing of governmental principles.57
The irony lies in the fact that the court’s opinion is 
contrary to one of the fundamental concepts of state 
government— the concept of a strong executive. The court 
maintains that it is their duty to understand the prin­
ciples of government ; however, by their decision they turn
57-104 Mont, 152.
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their backs on one of the most important principles in 
state government.
For this study^s hypothesis, all three of these 
decisions, through the court^s mode of interpretation in 
the absence of clear constitutional or statutory direction, 
have weakened the governor*s removal power.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS
Jacksonian democracy left the American people with
an inheritance of little trust in the executive branch and
a rising loss of popular confidence in the legislative
branch. "In the middle of the nineteenth century a weakened
and discredited legislature balanced a weakened execu- 
1tive." Gradually, however, the governor's legislative 
influence became stronger as confidence in the legisla­
tive branch continued to decline.
Today, paradoxically, one of the Montana governor's 
most important executive powers is legislative. The posi­
tive side of this power is the governor's legislation
2approval power; the negative side is the governor’s veto
3power. The Montana governor has other positive executive 
powers within the legislative branch, such as the power to 
call extraordinary sessions of the legislative assembly,^
 ̂Leslie Lipson, The American Governor from Figure- 
head to Leader (Chicagot University of Chicago Press, T93^TTTrTJS7
^Mont. Const., Art. V, sec. 40.
3Mont. Const., Art, Vll, secs. 12, 13.
^Mont. Const., Art. Vll, sec. 11.
56
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and the power of policy formation when he appears before 
the assembly to give his "State of the State" address.^
The Approval Power 
Introduction 
Article VII, section 12, of the Montana consti­
tution carefully defines the role of the governor in the 
final approval of legislation,^ There appear to be only 
two exceptions to this role of gubernatorial participations 
first, the actions of a single house are regarded as merely 
internal to that chamber and do not require the governor’s 
approval, and second, the actions of both houses "relating 
solely to the transaction of the business of the two 
houses"also are exempt from the governor’s approval.
% o n t , Const,, Art. VII, sec. 10, See Coleman B, 
Ransone, Jr., The Office of Governor in the United States 
(University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1956),
chap, 7.
^Mont. Const,, Art, VII, sec. 12, Every bill passed 
by the legislative assembly shall, before it becomes a law, 
be presented to the governor. If he approves, he shall 
sign it, and thereupon it shall become a law, . . , If any 
bill shall not be returned by the governor within five days 
(Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to 
him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had 
signed it, , , . N o  bill shall become a law after final 
adjournment of the legislative assembly, unless approved 
by the governor within fifteen days after such adjourn­
ment . , , o
"^Mont. Const,, Art. V, sec, 40. This constitutional 
provision also stipulates that concurrent (joint) resolu­
tions must be signed by the governor, whereas, the federal 
constitution does not impose such a requirement of partici­
pation on the president. The Montana supreme court has also
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Governor^ s Approval of Legislative 
Enactments
General
Since 1907, the Montana supreme court has had four 
different occasions to discuss the governor's power to 
approve legislation. In all four cases, the court did in­
cidentally note that the approval power was a constitu­
tionally created power which gave the governor a funda­
mental and component role in the legislative process.
The Evers Case
The first Montana supreme court decision to dis­
cuss the governor’s legislation approval power was Evers v. 
Hudson, which stated that when the governor fails to re­
turn within five days any bill passed by the legislature 
and presented to him during the session, the bill becomes 
law as if the governor had signed it.
During the 1907 legislative assembly, a statute was 
enacted to establish county free high schools. The bill 
was presented to the governor for his approval, but before 
sine die adjournment, the governor failed to approve the
held that the governor must approve constitutional amend­
ments, whereas, at the national level, the President does 
not formally participate in the amendment process. See 
the Livingstone case in this chapter.
^36 Mont. 135, 92 P. 462 (1907).
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bill. It was urged that the bill failed to become law
because it lacked the governor's approval as required by
section 23 of the act which provided that this "Act shall
take effect and be in full force from and after its passage
and approval by the governor.
The court ruled that although the act had never
been expressly approved by the governor it nevertheless
became law in accordance with the Montana constitution
which provided that
If any bill shall not be returned by the governor 
within five days (Sunday excepted) after it shall 
have been presented to him, the same shall be a 
law, in like manner as if he had signed it. . . .'^
The court held that the act became law as if it had been
signed and approved by the governor, irrespective of what
section 23 of the act had provided. However, since the
approval issue was not the controlling issue in the case,
it must be remembered that the court's statements are only
dictum.
The Hay Case
State ex rel. Hay v, Hindson^^ stated that legis­
lative enactments passed on the last day of the session and
^1907 Laws, c. 29, sec. 23.
^Awont. Const,, Art, Vll, sec. 12. 
Mont. 353, 106 P. 362 (1910).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 0
not acted upon by the governor until after adjournment muŝ . 
be signed by the governor before they become operative as 
lawo
The question presented by the case did not focus 
on the governor’s approval power; instead, it focused on 
possibly contradictory provisions in two different pieces 
of legislation = The governor’s legislation approval power 
was mentioned in passing since both measures had been passed 
on the last day of the legislative session and had not 
been acted upon by the governor until after final adjourn­
ment o
The court noted that Article VII, section 12, of 
the Montana constitution required that the governor must 
approve legislation which was enacted the last day of the 
session and not signed by the governor until after the 
adjournment. In addition, the court noted that both pieces 
of legislation were signed by the governor after adjourn­
ment within the time required so as to make them both 
operative as law.
The Toomey Case
1 2State ex rel. Toomey v. State Board of Examiners 
stated that the time of the governor’s approval by signa­
ture fixed the time the enactment became law.
1274 Mont. 1, 23S P. 316 (1925)
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The main issue focused on the clarity of an 
appropriation statute which had been signed by the governor 
four days before another general appropriation bill had 
been approved.
The court stipulated that "no matter what the order 
of the passage of these two appropriation bills in the 
two houses of the legislature, neither had any force or 
effect until approved by the governor, which act . , , fixed 
the time when each became a law."^̂
The Vaughn Case
Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. State Board of Equali­
zation^^ held that when a bill with a defective enacting 
clause is signed by the presiding officer of each house 
and the governor, the bill does not become law because the 
defective enacting clause is a fatal defect.
The facts were that a piece of legislation had the 
proper enacting clause incorporated into the bill at the 
committee stage after the bill had been introduced with a 
defective enacting clause. With the proper enacting clause, 
the bill passed in both houses. Somehow the original 
defective enacting clause was reinstated before it was 
signed by the governor, so that the governor signed a bill
^^74 Mont. 15.
^109 Mont, 52, 96 P.2d 420 (1939).
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which was then not the same bill as passed in both houses» 
The majority noted that the bill which had passed 
both houses was not the identical bill which had been 
signed by the governor, and therefore ruled that the bill 
was not law since the bill with the proper enacting clause 
had not passed all the stages of the legislative process»
Summary
None of the four Montana cases noted has had as 
its principal issue the governor’s legislation approval 
power, but all of them incidentally discussed aspects of 
this executive power» These cases have recognized that the 
governor plays a fundamental and component part in the 
legislative process»
The approval power does provide the governor with 
an opportunity to play a role in the legislative policy 
formation process» In state government, and particularly 
in Montana where the legislature is in session only for 
two months out of every two years, the governor should have 
some role in the legislative process since it will be his 
office and the executive branch which must implement and 
execute the laws passed by the legislative assembly»
These four cases have little relevance for the 
study’s hypothesis since the first three cases possessed 
clear constitutional direction for the court in rendering
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its decision; thus, the court did not have to exercise any 
mode of interpretation. In the fourth case, the court did 
not have clear constitutional or statutory direction in 
reaching its decision. Thus, it did exercise a mode of 
interpretation, but the subject was the validity of a 
defective enacting clause and not the governor’s approval 
power.
Governor’s Approval of Constitutional
Amendments
General
It has been noted that the Montana governor plays 
a role in the amending process of the state constitution. 
This role of participation by the state executive in the 
amending process is unique. At the national level, the 
president does not formally participate in the amendment 
process; and in Montana, there is an excellent argument 
that the Montana governor also should not participate in 
the amending process. However, the Montana supreme court 
has chosen to involve the governor.
The Livingstone Case
Remarkably, after seven decades of state legis-
1 5lation, State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray held that 
when the legislature neglects to present a proposed
1^137 Mont. 557, 354 P.2d 552 (1960)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
constitutional amendment to the governor for his approval 
or rejection, the legislature creates a fatal defect in the 
amendment process.
In 1959 * the legislative assembly passed a proposed 
amendment to the Montana constitution by the required two- 
thirds vote in each house. The amendment was not referred 
to the governor as had been common practice, but was sent 
directly to Secretary of State Frank Murray for publication, 
While the legislature was still in session, the attorney 
general rendered an opinion stating that the approval by 
the governor was not necessary on proposed constitutional 
amendments «^^ Before publication of the proposal by the 
secretary of state, Livingstone sought an injunction to 
restrain the secretary of state from publishing the pro­
posed amendment.
Justice Bottomly, delivering the opinion of the 
court, ruled that the proposed constitutional amendment 
contained a fatal defect when the legislature neglected to 
present the proposed amendment to the governor for his 
approval or disapproval. He maintained that Article V, 
section 40, of the Montana constitution required the 
governor’s approval since it did not exempt proposed 
amendments from the governor’s signature although it had
^^20 Op, Atty, Gen, B (1959-1960)
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1 7listed certain other exemptions^ Justice Bottomly, more
centrally to the problem, argued that the amending article.,
1 gArticle XIX, section 9, of the Montana constitution, 
should not control the legislative article, Article V , 
section 40, Therefore, "any vote of the Legislature re­
quiring concurrence of both houses must be presented to 
the governor for his approval or disapproval and unless this 
step is taken the vote is of no force or effect for any 
purpose unless the vote is presented to the governor for his 
approval or disapproval,"^^ In concluding his argument, 
with reference to the legislative article, he stated'
1% o n t . Const,, Art. V, sec, 40, Every order, 
resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both houses 
may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, 
or relating solely to the transaction of the business of 
the two houses, shall be presented to the governor,, and 
before it shall take effect be approved by him, or, being 
disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of both houses, as 
prescribed in the case of a bill,
 ̂̂ Mont, Const,, Art, XjX, sec, 9= Amendments to 
this constitution may be proposed in either house of the 
legislative assembly, and if the same shall be voted for 
by two-thirds of the members elected to each house, such 
proposed amendments, together with the ayes and nays of 
each house thereon, shall be entered in full on their 
respective journals; and the secretary of state shall 
cause the said amendment or amendments to be published , „ . 
and , p p submitted to the qualified electors of the state 
for their approval or rejection and such as are approved 
by a majority of those voting thereon shall become part 
of the constitution,
^^137 Mont, 567.
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It should be remembered that our Montana 
Constitution is unique among state constitutions =
We find no other state constitution which con­
tains the same provisions as ours. For these 
reasons, the decisions from other jurisdictions 
construing their state constitutions or the 
federal constitution have little value or weight 
here, as they construe constitutional provisions 
altogether unlike our own. They are not in 
point here,20
Justice Angstman concurred specially in the result 
that the injunction should be issued against the secretary 
of state. However, he did not believe that it was neces­
sary for a proposed constitutional amendment to be sub­
mitted to the governor for his approval. His argument was 
twofold: first, he maintained that the spirit of Article V, 
section 1, of the Montana constitution eliminated the need 
for the governor’s approval of proposed constitutional 
amendments since the article states that "the veto power 
of the governor shall not extend to measures referred to 
the people by the legislative as se mb ly .Se co nd ,  he be­
lieved that the amending article, Article XlX, section 9, 
was a special provision which was not to be "controlled
by general provisions in the Constitution and particularly
22not by section 40 of Article V." It was Justice Angstman’s
2O137 Mont. 567. 
'̂‘137 Mont. 569. 
2^137 Mont. 569.
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belief that a proposed constitutional amendment, after passage
in both houses, could go directly to the people for their 
approval. In other words, he believed the governor was 
exempt from participating in the amendment process.
Summary
In the Livingstone case, the Montana supreme court 
held that the governor plays a formal and vital role in the 
amending process of the Montana constitution. The opinion 
is strange in that it is unique, both at the state and 
national level. Although the decision does strengthen the 
office of the Montana governor in that the executive be­
comes another check on the legislature when it passes pro­
posed constitutional amendments, nevertheless, it also in­
volves the governor in an area which history and logic dic­
tate should be left to the legislative assembly and the 
people. In addition, the notion of an executive check on 
constitutional amendment proposals rests in a misunder­
standing of constitutional theory.
First of all, constitutional amendments should not 
be confused with, and be treated like, ordinary legislation. 
The authority to propose amendments to the constitution is 
a separate article of the constitution. Thus, the power 
to amend is not necessarily a part of the power to legis­
late. Secondly, there is already one check on the
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legislative branch since all proposed amendments must be 
approved by the people after being passed by the legisla­
tive assembly. Thirdly, where does it specifically state 
in the Montana constitution that the governor is supposed 
to approve proposed constitutional amendments? Nowhere is 
it specifically stated that the governor must approve the 
proposed constitutional amendments before they are sub­
mitted to the people for their approval. Rather, the 
amending article, Article XIX, section 9> impliedly ex­
cludes the governor from participating in the amending pro­
cess.
In addition, it seems strange that the court placed 
so little emphasis on Article V, section I, which specifi­
cally states that the governor does not possess the approval
or veto power over those "measures referred to the people
23by the legislative assembly." Certainly a constitutional 
amendment comes within the spirit of this section since it 
is referred to the people by the legislature. Also, why 
should the court choose section 40, an original provision 
of the constitution, over section 1, as amended, a later 
expression of the popular will? The court chose a de­
tailed specification of the legislative process to prevail 
over the separate and special constitutional provision
23Mont. Const., Art. V, sec. 1
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regarding the procedure for amendment of the constitution.
With reference to the hypothesis of this study, 
this case is significant. The court lacked any clear 
prima facie constitutional or statutory direction. The 
court’s mode of interpretation strengthened the governor’s 
approval power, but only by moving into an area— constitu­
tional amendments--previously and generally regarded as 
outside the governor’s range of powers. Thus, for the 
purpose of this study, it may be concluded that the 
Livingstone case furnishes an instance in which the Montana 
supreme court, through its mode of interpretation, has 
strengthened the governor’s approval power; however, in all 
fairness to the study, it must be noted that the decision 
strengthens the governor’s approval power by going outside 
the previously defined limits of this power.
The Veto Power 
Introduction
The Montana governor’s veto power is lodged in, and 
defined by, Article VII, sections 12 and 13, of the Montana 
constitution. This veto power can be qualified or absolute 
depending on particular circumstances at the time. The 
governor’s veto is qualified when it can be overridden by 
a two-thirds vote in both houses; it is absolute after the 
assembly has adjourned since all bills presented to the
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governor after adjournment must be signed by him within 15 
days. The veto power, be it qualified or absolute, con­
tributes materially to the powers of the Montana governor.
The governor implements his qualified veto by 
returning a bill unsigned to the house in which the bill 
originated along with a statement of his objections. The 
executive’s veto prevails and defeats the bill unless the 
assembly, with a quorum present, overrides the governor’s 
action by a two-thirds vote in each house. The governor 
implements his absolute veto when he fails to approve a 
bill within 15 days after adjournment. This method is 
often called a "pocket veto.”
The Item Veto
General
The item veto power of the Montana governor is 
located in Article VII, section 13> of the Montana consti­
tution, and provides that the governor, unlike the presi­
dent, can veto items in an appropriations bill and still 
approve the remainder. Consequently, the governor is never 
saddled with the burden of having to choose between 
approving or vetoing an appropriation measure which has a 
repugnant "rider" attached to it, as the president is often 
obligated to do. This item veto effectively prevents the 
legislature from attaching riders to legislation since the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
governor, through the use of the item veto, can single out 
the riders and reject them while approving the remainder 
of the bill. The item veto has only once been the subject 
of a Montana supreme court decision.
The Veto Case
The well-known Veto case^^ held that the governor's 
constitutional item veto power does not include the power 
to scale items in appropriation measures.
Governor Dixon reduced eight items in an appropri­
ation bill which had provided money for the operation and 
maintenance of various state boards, commissions and 
departments. After reducing these items, the governor 
approved the whole bill since he could not return the bill 
to the legislature which had adjourned.
Chief Justice Callaway noted that "While the supreme 
executive power of this state is vested in the governor 
{Const., Art. VII, sec. 5), he is forbidden to exercise any
legislative function except that granted to him expressly
25by the terms of the Constitution," The court recognized 
that the constitution expressly granted an item veto power 
to the governor to disapprove items in appropriation bills. 
But Article Vll, section 13» of the constitution
24Mills V .  Porter, 69 Mont. 325, 222 P. 428 (1924) 
2^69 Mont. 330
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presented a problem for the court because the section used 
both the words ”part” and "item" in a troublesome fashion. 
Chief Justice Callaway believed the words were to be used 
interchangeably and were meant to be used as synonyms; any 
other meaning or interpretation of the words other than as 
synonyms would violate both the spirit and letter of the 
constitution.
The court concluded that the governor did not have
the power to veto a part of an item in any appropriation
bill. It relied heavily on an Illinois case which stated:
The legislative branch of the government is vested 
with the discretion to determine the amount which 
should be appropriated for any particular object.
The Governor, as the chief executive of the State, 
is given the right to approve or disapprove of any 
action of the legislature in making such an approp­
riation. He may disapprove of it . . . for any 
other reason satisfactory to him, but he has not 
the right to disapprove of a certain portion of an 
item appropriated and approve of the remainder, 
and thus perform a function which belongs exclu­
sively to the legislative branch,--that of using 
the discretion necessary to determine the amount 
which should be appropriated for any particular 
object.27
Mont. Const., Art. VII, sec. 13* The governor 
shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any 
bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct 
items, and the part or parts approved shall become a law, 
and the item or items disapproved shall be void. . . .
27Fergus v. Russel, 270 111. 304, 348, 349 (1915), 
as quoted in Mills v. Porter, 69 Mont. 325, 333, 334.
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Summary
The courtes decision seems consistent with the 
functional system of needed checks and balances in state 
government. Had the court upheld the governor's attempted 
scaling, it would have allowed the governor to determine 
the amount to be appropriated in any given bill; it would, 
in effect, have granted part of the legislation function 
of appropriating money to the executive.
Concerning this study's hypothesis, the Veto case 
decision is relevant since the court exercised a mode of 
interpretation in the absence of any clear constitutional 
provision or statute. This mode of interpretation brought 
the court to hold that the governor, as a proper exercise 
of his item veto power, could not scale specific items in 
an appropriations bill. This mode of interpretation, to 
the extent that it affirms the governor's item veto power, 
strengthens the powers of the governor, while at the same 
time, it provides that the legislative function must be 
exercised by the legislature unless a specific grant of 
the legislative function has been made to one of the other 
co-equal branches of state government. Thus, for the sake 
of this study, it can be concluded that the mode of inter­
pretation exercised by the Montana supreme court in the 
Veto case is consistent with the concept of a strong 
governor, to the extent that it affirms the governor's item
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veto powero
Proclamation Power to Convene Extra­
ordinary Legislative Sessions
Although the Montana constitution makes the exer­
cise of legislative powers independent from the exercise
2 àof executive powers, the Montana governor, nevertheless, 
possesses certain constitutional checks which basically 
are legislative powers„ One of these checks is that the 
governor may convene extraordinary sessions of the legis­
lative assembly by issuing a proclamation stating the pur-
2Qpose for the session^ When such a special session Is 
called, the assembly is limited to legislation only within 
those subject areas specified by his call; that is, speci­
fied by the proclamation or by a subsequent message to tne 
assemblyo
The Montana supreme court on five different 
occasions has considered whether specific legislation was 
within the governor-s call for an extraordinary session.
On two occasions the issue focused on whether the legis­
lation passed during the extra session was within the pur­
view of the governor's proclamation; on the three other 
occasions, the issue focused on whether the legislation was
^^Monto Consto, Art. IV, sec, ?, 
^^Monto Const,, Art, VII, sec, H
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within the scope of the governor’s subsequent message to 
the assemblyo Actually, there is no apparent difference 
in Montana whether the governor’s request for legislation 
is placed in the proclamation or in a subsequent message ; 
both are regarded as part of his call*,
The Governor's Proclamation 
The Ac C, Mo Company Case
State ex relo Anaconda Copper Mining Company v,
30Clancy"^ held that certain legislation regarding the dis­
qualification of district judges was within the call of 
the governor's proclamation since the legislation achieved 
"the ends sought to be accomplished in his call."^^
On November 10, 1903? the governor issued a procla­
mation convening the eighth legislative assembly in extra­
ordinary sessiono The proclamation stated that the session 
was convened in part to secure legislation which would pro­
vide for the disqualification of district judges once an 
allegation of bias or prejudice was made.^^ Pursuant to 
this call the legislature enacted two pieces of legislation
3^30 Mont. 529; 77 P. 312 (1904).
"̂*30 Mont. 536.
^^For an insight into the need for this legisla­
tion, and the impact it had on the socio-economic and 
political problems within Montana, see C. B„ Glasscock, 
The War of the Copper Kings (New York: Blue Ribbon Books
Inc., 1965); chap. 20.
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one of which was entitled "An Act to Amend Section 1Ô0 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to the Disqualifi­
cation of Judges." Section 180 was amended by adding Sub­
section 4 which provided in part:
When either party makes and files an affi­
davit as hereinafter provided, that he has
reason to believe, and does believe, he cannot 
have a fair and impartial hearing or trial be­
fore a district judge by reason of the bias or 
prejudice of such judge. . . , Upon the filing 
of the affidavit the judge as to whom said dis­
qualification is averred, shall be without author­
ity to act further in the action, motion or 
proceeding, but the provisions of this section 
do not apply to . . . the power of transferring 
the action or proceeding to some other court, 
nor to the power of calling in another district 
judge to sit and act in such action or 
proceeding. . . .33
Soon thereafter in Silver Bow County an affidavit
alleging prejudice and bias was filed against District
Judge Clancy; however, Clancy refused to step down, and
instead, proceeded with the trial. The mining company
upon Clancy's refusal to step down from the case brought
an action under the statute to prohibit him from continuing
on with the case.
In determining whether the legislation was within
the purview of the governor's proclamation, Justice Holloway
noted that it was fairly easy to determine that the
governor's purpose for calling the extra session was to
331903 Laws (E.S.), c. 3, p. 10,
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secure some legislation whereby a district judge could be 
charged with entertaining a bias or prejudice and could be 
disqualified. With this purpose apparent, the court held 
that the legislation was within the purview of the gover­
nor^ s proclamation.
any enactment which will meet the ends 
sought to be accomplished in his call must be
deemed to be embraced within the limits of the
subjects submitted for considérâtion.34
The Blackford Case
The other Montana supreme court decision deter­
mining whether specific legislation was within the purview 
of the governor*s proclamation was Blackford v. Judith Basin 
C o u n t y , i n  which the court held that certain legislation 
granting tax relief was within the call of the governor* s 
proclamation.
The Judith Basin County commissioners acquired a 
tax deed to land owned by Blackford. Later, he made an
offer and demand to purchase the land for a sum which in­
cluded the amount of taxes due, plus penalties and interest. 
He claimed this right was provided by Chapter 33 of the 
1933-34 Extraordinary Session which granted to former 
property owners a preferential right to purchase
3430 Mont. 536.
35109 Mont. 570, 98 P.2d 8?2 (1940)
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tax-acquired property. The board rejected Blackford*s 
offer and accepted a higher offer, whereupon Blackford 
brought an action against them.
The case presented many issues, one of which was 
whether Chapter 33 was within the scope of the governor’s 
proclamation. On this issue, Chief Justice Johnson noted 
that the proclamation stated that the ninth purpose for 
convening the legislature was "To amend the law in rela­
tion to the time for redeeming real estate from tax liens. 
Furthermore, he noted that Chapter 33 did not actually 
extend the time of redemption from tax liens, but under 
certain conditions did "afford an equivalent relief by
enabling the former owner to buy back his property for the
37amount of taxes, penalties and interest." He held
therefore that Chapter 33 was related to, and germane to,
the governor’s proclamation since it had "a natural con-
3 8nection" with the subject stated in the proclamation.
In holding that the legislation was within the purview of 
the proclamation, the chief justice quoted the A . C. M, 
Company case decision which held that "any enactment which 
will meet the ends sought to be accomplished in his call
^^1933-34 Laws (E.S.), p. 3. 
"̂̂ 109 Mont. 588.
^^109 Mont. 588.
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must be deemed to be embraced within the limits of the 
subjects submitted for consideration»"^^
The Governor’s Message
The Sweeney Case
The first Montana supreme court decision deter­
mining whether specific legislation was within the call of 
the governor’s message was Sweeney v» City of B u t t e , i n  
which the court held that the legislation concerning the 
recovery of salaries by policemen was within the scope of 
the governor’s message.
During the summer of 1919, the governor by procla­
mation called a special session of the legislative assembly, 
and in his message to the assembly he requested that the 
law regarding municipal police departments be reviewed» 
During the session the legislature did enact legislation 
concerning the recovery of salaries by members of municipal 
police forces. This legislation provided (1) that actions 
to recover salaries by members of municipal police depart­
ments must be commenced within six months after the cause 
of action arose, and (2) that no action could be maintained 
by such members except for services actually rendered or
39state ex rel» Anaconda Copper Mining Company v, 
Clancy, 30 Mont. 536 {1904), as quoted in 109 Mont » 590»
^ % 4  Mont. 230, 208 P. 943 (1922) »
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i 1for the days when the member would report for dutyo
On May 28, 1920, Sweeney commenced a successful 
mandamus proceeding to compel the city of Butte to restore 
him to his former position on the police force, with pay­
ment of back salary» Sweeney filed his claim for the back 
salary, but the city clerk refused to accept and pay it »
One of the issues in the case was whether Chapter 11 
enacted at the 1919 special session was within the scope 
of the governor's message as required by Article VII, 
section 11, of the Montana constitution» Commissioner 
Comer, who prepared the opinion for the court, held:
The subject of the message or recommendation of 
the governor now under consideration is an amend­
ment to the law relating to the "department of 
police,” for the purpose of obviating certain 
conditions in the future, viz», the payment of 
salaries where no services are rendered » The 
provisions of Chapter 11 pertain to this recom­
mendation, but do not go beyond its scope or
purview»42
The Dishman Case
The second Montana supreme court decision resolving 
the issue of whether specific legislation was within the 
scope of the governor's message was State of Montana v» 
D i s h m a n , i n  which the court held that legislation
4^1919 Laws (E»S») , c» 11 »
4264 Mont» 239,
^^64 Mont» 530, 210 P» 604 (1922)»
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prohibiting the sale of liquor was within the scope of the 
governor^s message which requested additional legislation 
for the suppression of the illegal traffic in liquor.
On March 15» 1921, "the governor transmitted to the 
assembly while in extra session a special message, in which 
he recommended the enactment of further legislation for the 
suppression of illegal traffic in intoxicating liquors.
The assembly enacted legislation which prohibited the sell­
ing of liquor, and later Dishman was convicted under the 
law.^^ He alleged that this law was invalid because the 
subject matter was not within the scope of the governor* s 
proclamation.
Justice Holloway agreed that the subject matter of 
Chapter 9 was not within the scope of the governor*s procla­
mation; however, he stated that a "subject submitted by 
special message while the assembly is convened in extra­
ordinary session is before the assembly for consideration 
to the same extent as if specifically mentioned in the 
proclamation,**^^ Thus, the court held that since the 
governor*s message has the same binding effect on legisla­
tion as does the proclamation, Chapter 9 was within the
^^64 Mont. 532.
^^1921 Laws (E.S.), c. 9- 
^^64 Mont, 532.
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scope of the governor*s call»
The Pierson Case
Pierson v. Hendricksen^’̂ held that legislation pro­
viding for the creation of new school districts was within 
the scope of the governor* s message which requested legis­
lation providing for the consolidation of school districts» 
Pierson, a resident and a taxpayer in a newly 
created high school district, brought an action to enjoin 
the issuance and sale of bonds for improvements to the 
county high school. He claimed that Chapter 47 which pro­
vided for the creation of new school districts was not 
within the purview of the governor*s proclamation.
Justice Angstman, for the court, took note that 
the **general subject of consolidating school districts was 
submitted by the message of December 7,” which he held con­
ferred upon the legislative assembly the authority "to 
pass legislation effecting consolidation of school districts 
for all p u r p o s e s . I n  addition he stated that such 
"consolidations would in effect create new districts 
In conclusion, the court held that Chapter 47 was within 
the purview of the governor*s proclamation since the
4790 Mont. 244, 3Ô P.2d 991 (1934).
^^90 Mont. 250.
499g Mont. 250,
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governor’s message has the same binding authority as does 
his proclamation.
Summary
The Montana constitution has placed considerable 
power in the governor by providing that all legislation 
enacted during an extra session must be within the gover­
nor’s call--that is, the governor’s proclamation convening 
the special session or one of the governor’s subsequent 
messages to the assembly. This constitutional power 
possessed by the governor gives him real power to control 
the direction of the legislation to be enacted by the 
special session. It would appear to be in the best interest 
of state government for the state courts to liberally inter­
pret this provision so as to increase both the governor’s 
and the legislative assembly’s power by enlarging the 
general subject areas in which the legislature must act. 
Thus, it is in the best interest of Montana government for 
the Montana supreme court to exercise a mode of interpre­
tation, in the absence of clear constitutional or statutory 
direction, that will also liberally interpret this consti­
tutional provision. On this point it is my belief that the 
language of the A. C. M. Company decision should continue to 
be controlling
. . . any enactment which will meet the ends 
sought to be accomplished in his call must be
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deemed to be embraced within the limits of
the subjects submitted for c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 50
The five cases before the court on this subject 
of whether certain legislation was within the call of the 
governor's proclamation have presented relatively easy 
situations for the court to rule and hold that the legis­
lation in question was within the governor’s call. In 
rendering these decisions, the court has not been restric­
tive in its exercise of its mode of interpretation, and 
therefore it is possible to conclude for the purposes of 
this study that all five cases have assisted in strengthen- 
ing this power which the governor possesses by constitu­
tional grant.




Article VIIj section 9? of the Montana constitu­
tion vests the power to pardon in the office of the 
governor. However, before the governor can exercise this 
power, the proposed action must be approved by the state 
board of pardons. In accordance with the constitution, the 
approval by the board need not be unanimous; a simple 
majority is sufficient.
The pardon power is the constitutionally defined 
power vested in the governor which allows the executive to 
grant pardons, absolute or conditional; commutations of 
punishment; and reprieves for any offense against the 
criminal laws of Montana. A pardon is a declaration by 
the governor which releases the offender from all punish­
ment for the offense and from the disabilities which would 
occur upon conviction. A commutation of sentence is a 
substitution of a lesser punishment for a greater punish­
ment. A reprieve postpones for a definite time execur ion 
of a sentence. The Montana governor's pardon power also 
includes the power to suspend or to remit the collection
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of a fine or forfeiture.
$
Operation and Effect of Pardon 
General
A pardon operates directly on both the punishment 
for the offense and the guilt of the offender., In a full 
pardon, the punishment and guilt of the offender are com­
pletely erased so that the law treats the offender as if 
he had never committed the offense. In a conditional par­
don, the punishment is suspended, although the guilt re­
mains as do all the disabilities inherent in the convic­
tion. A conditional pardon will in effect become a full 
pardon once the conditions of the pardon have been per­
formed ; however, until they are performed, the Montana 
supreme court has held that a conditional pardon has an 
effect similar to that of a parole.^
The Sutton Case
The only Montana supreme court decision to discuss
2the effect of a conditional pardon was In Re Sutton, 
which held that a conditional pardon is similar to a parole, 
so that one who receives a conditional pardon from the 
governor is released only from the punishment--not from the 
judgment of conviction as he would have been had he
TIn Re Sutton, 50 Mont. 88, 145 P» 6 (1914) 
250 Mont. 88.
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received a full or absolute pardon*
Sutton, an attorney, was convicted of forgery and 
sentenced to two years in the state prison* Upon his con­
viction and in accordance with a statute, Sutton was pre­
sented with a show cause order from the Montana supreme 
court to show cause why he should not be disbarred * ̂  
Sutton^s answer to the court’s show cause order was that 
the governor had issued an executive order pardoning him* 
The pardon, however, was conditional by its very language 
Sutton argued that
o o * the effect of the pardon is not only to 
release him from the punishment inflicted by 
the judgment of conviction, but that it obliter­
ates, in legal contemplation, the offense itself 
and restores him to the same standing in the 
community as if the offense had never been com­
mitted» 5
In other words, he maintained that the judgment of convic­
tion was canceled by his pardon and could not serve as a
^Mont, Rev* Codes, sec » 6409 (190?)» In case of 
the conviction of an attorney and counselor of a felony 
or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude, the clerk of 
the court in which such conviction is had shall, within 
thirty days thereafter, transmit to the supreme court a 
certified copy of the record of conviction»
^The conditions of the pardon were that Sutton 
(1) must make a written report monthly to the secretary of 
the board of pardons stating his address, nature of work, 
employer, etc», (2) shall not be guilty of any breach of 
law, and abstain from the use of intoxicating liquors,
(3) must provide for his wife and children, and (4) shall 
remain in the legal custody of the state board of prison 
commissioners»
550 Mont» 9 1 , 9 2 o
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basis for the disbarment proceeding «
Chief Justice Brantly^ speaking for che court„ held 
that the pardon granted to Sutton was conditional^ having 
the same effect as a paroleo
The act of the governor o . « though desig­
nated by him as a pardon, is closely assimilated 
to a paroleo . . » A parole does not operate to 
wipe out the judgment of conviction but merely 
suspends its operation by remitting, for the time 
being, the confinement and hard labor, until the 
end of the terra, or until an unconditional par­
don is granted.6
The court held that the governor's imposition of the condi­
tions in the pardon implied the existence of a judgment 
which could not be canceled until the conditions in the 
pardon had been performed. Thus, the judgment of convic­
tion remained and could serve as a basis for the disbarment 
proceedingo
Summary
In the Sutton case, the governor granted to Sutton 
a pardon which was conditional by its very naturec. The 
court held as a matter of interpretation that the pardon 
was, in effect, similar to a parole. The governor could 
have granted Sutton a full pardon, but instead he granted 
a pardon with specific conditions attachedo
The court * s opinion respects the governor's pardon
^50 Mont. 94o
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power0 The court held that when the governor grants a par­
don with conditionss the pardon is in effect a parole which 
suspends the punishment but does not cancel the judgment of
convictiono In the Sutton case, the court has exercised a
mode of interpretation in the absence of clear constitutional 
or statutory direction, and has clearly defined the effect 
of a conditional pardon, while at the same time it has 
respected the governor''s pardon power.
Encroachments upon the Pardon Power
Encroachment by the Judiciary
General
When the constitution vests the pardon power in the 
governor, as in Montana, the courts have no jurisdiction 
in criminal eases to exercise this power. The Montana 
supreme court, on two different occasions, has been pre­
sented with questions concerning the judiciary’s relation­
ship to, and possible encroachment upon, the governor’s 
pardon power. In both cases the decisions, in part, focused 
on the district court’s implementation of Montana’s sus­
pended sentence statute.
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The Reid Case
The first of these two cases was State ex relo 
Reid Vo District Court,^ in which the court held that a 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify a judgment after 
it had been pronounced and after the defendant had started 
serving the sentence. Such a modification would be an 
encroachment by the district court upon the executive's 
constitutional pardon power.
Reid was sentenced to six months in jail and fined 
$500o He was then committed to the county jail and after 
he had served eight days of his sentence the district 
court entered an order reducing the sentence and judgment.
Chief Justice Callaway stated, for the court ̂ 
that Montana’s suspended sentence statute allowed the 
court to suspend the execution of a sentence ̂ but ruled 
that this power must be exercised at the time the sentence 
was pronounced. The district court ̂ by making the
'̂ 68 Monto 112.
^Monto ReVo Codes, sec. 1207^ (Choate 1921)o In 
all prosecutions for crimes or misdemeanors ̂ excep* as 
hereinafter provided, where the defendant has pleaded or 
been found guilty . . . and it appears that the defendant 
has never before been imprisoned for crime . o <> and where 
it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the char­
acter of the defendant and circumstances of the case are 
such that he is not likely again to engage in an offensive 
course of conduct . . . said court may suspend the execu­
tion of the sentence and place the defendant on prc- 
bation. . . .
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modification after the defendant began serving his sen­
tence, had "sought to exercise a power which the Consti­
tution reposes in the governor and board of pardons 
The court concluded that since the constitution had granted 
the pardon power to the executive it could not be exer­
cised by the judiciary.
The Sheehan Case
The other Montana supreme court decision discuss­
ing the judiciary’s encroachment upon the executive’s 
pardon power was Ex Parte Sheehan,^^ in which the court 
held, on a collateral issue, that when a justice court 
imposed a condition upon a suspended sentence, such an 
action constituted an encroachment upon the governor’s 
pardon power.
Sheehan pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge and 
was given a suspended sentence by the justice of the peace 
in Deer Lodge County, on the condition that Sheehan "leave 
and remain out of Deer Lodge County."  ̂̂
On the issue raised by Sheehan whether the condi­
tion attached to the suspended sentence was an encroachment
Mont. 312.
^°100 Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935) 
'’'*100 Mont. 249.
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upon the pardon power5, Justice Matthews, speaking for the 
court, held that the condition had no force or effect since 
it was in the nature of a pardon on condition which could 
only be exercised by the governoro ". . . Such remit­
tance of judgment after sentence is in the nature of a
1 2pardon on condition rather than p u n i s h m e n t T h u s , the 
court held that the justice court had tried to exercise the 
governor's pardon power when it made the suspended sentence 
conditional upon the defendant ̂ s exile from the county»
Summary
The Montana supreme court’s decisions in both the 
Reid and Sheehan cases have exercised a mode of interpre­
tation in the absence of clear constitutional or statutory 
direction which has strengthened the governor's pardon 
power since it has prohibited another branch of government 
from exercising this power^ The court in both cases has 
illustrated that it commands an understanding of what the 
pardon power is, and what constitutes an encroachment, upon 
this power »
The court rightly held in the Reid case that, after 
the defendant actually began serving his sentence, the exe­
cution of the sentence could not be interfered with unless 
by the governor’s exercise of his pardon power or by appeal,
1^100 Monte 255
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And the court correctly held in the Sheehan case that, 
although the justice court had the authority to suspend 
the sentence, it did not have the authority to put such a 
condition on the suspended sentence since the pronouncement 
of such a condition exceeded its jurisdiction and entered 
the domain of the governor’s pardon power.
Encroachment by the Legislature
General
When the Montana constitution vested the pardon
power in the governor, it presumably excluded the legis-
1 3lature from exercising this power. However, the legis­
lature can by statute confer upon a court the power to sus­
pend the execution of a sentence if the discretion of the 
court does not usurp the governor’s pardon power.
The Bottomly Case
The only Montana supreme court decision which has 
discussed the possibility of the legislature’s encroachment 
of the executive’s pardon power appears to have been State 
ex rel. Bottomly v. District Court.  ̂5 in which the court 
held that the Montana ’’suspended sentence” statute does not
 ̂̂ Mont. Const., A r t . IV, sec. l. See also 39 Am, 
Jur., Pardon secs. 21, 34.
^439 Am. Jur., Pardon sec. 33.
^^73 Mont. 541, 237 P. 525 (1925).
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impinge upon the governor’s pardoning power.
On December 13s 1924s Rasmussen was sentenced to 
be imprisoned in the county jail for 60 days and fined 
$200. On the same day he appealed the convict ion^ and the 
appeal was dismissed on May 14, 1925. The next day.
May 15? the district court suspended the sentence and 
placed Rasmussen on probation. One of the quest.ions bef'c _ e 
the court was whether the legislature’s enactment of the 
suspended sentence statute was an encroachment upon the 
governor’s pardon power.
Justice Hollowayj speaking for the court, noted 
that the first legislative assembly had enacted a suspended 
sentence statute? notwithstanding the constitutional pro - 
vision establishing the executive’s pardon power. He 
further noted that since tnen the legislature had rui t o . 
other occasions enacted legislation providing f o r  the - 
pension of sentences.
Thus It will be seen that from the organi­
zation of Montana as a territory to the present 
time— a period of sixty-one years--It has been 
assumed by all departments of our government, 
and the assumption has been acted upon, that the 
legislative branch of government had authority 
to provide for the suspension of the e.xecution 
of a judgment in a criminal case, and the legis­
lature has assumed to exercise the authority in 
at least three instances since the Const itut ion 
was adopted.  ̂̂
1673 Mont. 548
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The Montana court argued, in addit ion, that Che
terms "pardon," "commutation" and "respite" as found in
Article VII, section 9, of the state consC ita*: ion were
not "intended to comprehend the suspension of the exe"u-
1 7tion of a judgment." Justice Holloway noted that the
Montana suspended sentence statute did not make the
defendant a free man; instead, he was "in effect serving
1 Shis sentence, though not within the prison walls," Thin 
the court concluded that the Montana statute was not an 
encroachment upon the governor’s pardon power and thereto : 
was a valid legislative enactment.
Summary
The decision in tne Bottomly case fails clearly 
to distinguish the difference between the effec" of a su 
pended sentence and the effect of a reprie-e which, c,i 
course, is within the domain of the governor ’s parJr ,-i 
power. The purpose to be achieved by the suspended sent , 
statute is to allow a first offender to be released ■\n. 
probation in those cases where the circumstan:es dir cate 
that such a release will not endanger the pub 1 i : sai'̂  iy,
A suspended sentence in effect postpones the execu:i' n o: 
the sentence. But so does a reprieve, so what is tne
Mont. 549. 
^^73 Mont. 5^9, 550,
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difference? Apparentlyj the difference is that a reprieve 
postpones the execution of the sentence for a definite 
time, whereas a suspended sentence postpones the execution 
of the sentence for an indefinite time; that is, the time 
during which the offender obeys the laws and conditions 
imposed by the court. The court was not at all clear on 
this point.
However, had the court effectively distinguished 
between a suspended sentence and a reprieve, legislative 
enactment of the suspended sentence statute would not 
appear to be an encroachment upon the executive’s pardon 
power; the legislature should have the power to invest cer­
tain discretion in the judiciary so long as this discretion 
is not an encroachment upon the governor’s pardon power.
The court should have the discretionary power to suspend 
the sentence of a first offender where it believes the 
suspension to be in the best interest of all the parties 
concerned. However, this power should not be established 
until it is satisfactorily distinguished from the governor's 
reprieve power.
Encroachment by the State Board of Pardons
General
When the Montana constitution vested the pardon 
power in the governor, it required the state board of par­
dons to act in concert with the governor in exercising this
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power. The constitution provides that the governor shall 
be advised by the board and that the actions of the gover­
nor must be approved by the board. However, although the 
board has the power to advise and approve, this does not 
invest the board with the power to perform the pardon 
function per se.
The Herman-Roy Case
The only Montana supreme court decision to discuss
the state board of pardon*s encroachment on the executive’s
19pardon power was State ex rel. Herman and Roy v, Powell, 
in which the court held that the state board of pardons 
could not grant a parole to a subsequent escape sentence 
and thereby extinguish a former sentence; such a discharge 
of a former sentence would in effect be an exercise of, and 
an encroachment upon, the governor’s pardon power.
Herman was serving a five-year prison sentence at 
the time he escaped in July, 195Ô; Roy was serving a six- 
year sentence when he escaped in November, 195^» Each con­
vict was captured soon after his escape, pleaded guilty to 
the escape charge and received a one-year sentence on the 
escape charge. Later, at different times in 1959, each 
was paroled subject to serving out his time of the escape 
sentence. After serving the minimum time, each was paroled
^^139 Mont, 5^3, 367 P.2d 553 (1961).
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on his escape sentence. In 196O, each violated the condi­
tions of his parole and was returned to the state prison. 
Herman and Roy each contended that the board’s grant of 
the parole to the escape sentence resulted in a discharge 
of the original sentence.
The court rejected this argument of the petitioners
as to the effect of their paroles on the original sentences.
Justice John Harrison, for the court, ruled;
. . . /no Montana statut^ gives the /state board 
of pardon/7 power to extinguish a former sentence 
by paroling a man to a subsequent sentence. To 
sustain such an argument would have the effect of 
granting to the Board the right to pardon or com­
mute a sentence. This, of course, cannot be done 
because the exclusive power to pardon and commute 
a sentence rests in the office of the g o v e r n o r . 20
The court noted that a parole releases a convict from con­
finement before the expiration of his sentence, but that 
it does not change his status as a prisoner. In other 
words, the parole does not suspend the prisoner’s sentence, 
it merely substitutes a shorter confinement. In so hold­
ing, the court took note of a statute which states in 
part: , .A parole shall be ordered only for the best
interest of society, not as an award of clemency; it shall
? 1not be considered a reduction of sentence or pardon, , .
2^139 Mont. 586, 587.
^^Mont. Rev, Codes, sec. 94-9832 (1947)
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Thus, the Montana court held that paroling a man to a sub­
sequent sentence does not extinguish an earlier sentence 
since such a discharge would be tantamount to granting a 
pardon which the state board of pardons, without the 
governor, cannot do.
Summary
The court^ s mode of interpretation, in the absence 
of clear constitutional or statutory direction, in the 
Herman-Roy case has strengthened the governor’s pardon 
power since it has prohibited the board of pardons from 
exercising this power without the governor’s involvement. 
Again the Montana supreme court has illustrated that it 
understands what constitutes an encroachment upon this 
power. Although the state board of pardons has the author­
ity to advise the governor regarding pardons and the respon­
sibility to approve all pardons, it nevertheless does not 
have the authority to discharge a former sentence by 
paroling a convict to a subsequent escape sentence since 
such a discharge would be similar to a pardon or commuta­
tion of sentence which would be an exercise of the gover­
nor’s pardon power.
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Summary
On five different occasions the Montana supreme 
court has rendered decisions concerning the Montana 
governor's pardon power. In all five of these decisions, 
the Montana court has exercised a mode of interpreta­
tion, in the absence of clear constitutional or statu­
tory direction, which has respected the governor's pardon 
power. In four out of five of these decisions it has 
directly strengthened the executive*s pardon power, and it 
could have strengthened the power in the fifth case—  
the Bottomly case— had it distinguished clearly between a 
suspended sentence and a reprieve, ^11 in all the court 
has demonstrated an understanding of the pardon power and, 
furthermore, has prohibited the judiciary and an executive 
board from encroaching upon this constitutionally defined 
power. The court’s work could have been complete had it 
illustrated in the Bottomly case why a suspended sentence 
statute was different from a reprieve so as to clarify why 
the statute was not an encroachment on the governor’s 
pardon power.
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CHAPTER VI
MILITIA POWER: EXECUTIVE USE OF TROOPS
TO SUPPRESS INSURRECTION
Introduction 
The militia power of the Montana governor is 
defined in Article VII, section 6, of the state constitu­
tion which provides that the governor shall have the power 
to call out any part or all of the militia "to aid in the 
execution of the laws, to suppress insurrection or to 
repel invasion."^ The militia power, for the purposes
of this study, can best be defined as the executive*s
2"use of troops in aid of civil authorities."
When the governor exercises this militia power to 
suppress a riot, but does not declare martial law, he acts 
as a civil officer and directs the military forces in 
accordance with the law. Under this condition, the mili­
tary acts as a major police force and could, if need be, 
arrest and detain rioters until the disturbance is sup­
pressed, However, when the governor declares martial law.
^Mont. Const., Art. VII, sec. 6.
^Thurman Arnold, "Martial Law," Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences. ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman, X (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 194Ô), p. 162.
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"the civil status of the state is suspended and the governor 
acts in a military capacity as commander in chief of the 
military forces,"^ It appears that the usual test of deter­
mining whether martial law is in existence is whether or 
not the courts remain open»^
The Use of Troops in Aid of 
Civil Authorities
General
Labor troubles in Butte in 1914 furnished the 
governor with an occasion to exercise his militia power: 
to use the militia to aid the local law enforcement author­
ities in Silver Bow County. During the same year, a 
challenge of the governor's exercise of this power reached 
the Montana supreme court in the nationally known case of 
In Re McDonald,  ̂ which determined the limits of the 
militia power.
The McDonald Case 
In the McDonald case, the court held that the 
governor through his constitutional militia power could not
336 Am. Jur,, Military sec. 4 6 .
4Por a brief discussion of martial law, its defini­
tions, dimensions and effects, see Thurman Arnold, op. cit.
pp. 16 2-1 6 6,
In addition see notes in 9Ô Am. St. Rep. 772 (1904) 
Ann. Gas. 1914C 22, 65 L.R.A. 193 (1904), and 12 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 979 (19OÔ).
^49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914).
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declare martial law and thereby transfer the judicial func­
tion to a military commission,. On September 1, 1911, the 
governor by proclamation declared that Silver Bow County 
was in a state of insurrection and under martial law. On 
September 12, McDonald and others filed writs of habeas 
corpus alleging that they were being unlawfully detained 
by Major Donohue, the commander of the militia which the 
governor had ordered in to aid the local authorities in the 
suppression of the insurrection. Donohue replied that the 
detention was necessary because McDonald and the others were 
leaders of the insurrection. On September 24, GiUis filed 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging unlawful 
detention by virtue of a commitment issued by a summary 
court set up by the military authorities, while all the 
district courts were open and actively attending to their 
business. The commitment of Gillis was defended as a valid 
exercise of authority authorized by the governor’s procla­
mation of martial law. The Montana court joined both 
actions applying for writs of habeas corpus and heard them 
together.
The case raised two issues in an almost classical 
fashion and with reference to the detention of McDonald and 
the others who petitioned the court on September 12, Jus­
tice Sanner held that McDonald and the others were properly 
detained under the authority of the governor’s proclamation
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was valid and justifiable under Article VII, section 5,
of the Montana constitution, and properly conferred lawful
authority on the actions of the militia in arresting and
detaining McDonald and the others.
With reference to the second issue— Gillis*s trial
before a military tribunal. Justice Sanner held that the
governor did not have the constitutional authority to
establish a form of martial law which would authorize the
conviction of a citizen without a trial by jury.
. . . neither Æhe governor7 nor the military under him can lawfully punish for insurrection or for other violations of the law. The courts cannot be ousted by the agencies detailed to aid them; nor can their functions be transferred to tribunals unknown to the Constitution,^
Thus, the court held that although the governor may impose 
a certain degree of military rule during an insurrection, 
he has no authority to proclaim absolute martial law which 
means the abrogation of all constitutional guaranties, 
thereby granting jurisdiction to military tribunals to con­
vict civilians without a trial by jury.
Liability for Oppressive or Destructive Acts
General
The existence and implementation of the governor's 
militia power neither authorizes military license, nor
^49 Mont, 477 (1914).
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places the lives or property of citizens under the absolute 
control of the military. When the militia power is used 
to oppress citizens or to destroy property, the party 
responsible for such action will be held accountable. Thus, 
a reckless or destructive act ordered or executed by the 
commander will establish his liability for the damages; 
however, if an order to a subordinate to commit a destruc­
tive act was lawful or reasonable on its face, the subordi-
7nate who carries out the order will not be held liable.
The Herlihy Case 
The other Montana decision involving the governor's
gmilitia power was Herlihy v, Donohue, which illustrated 
the proposition that officers may be held responsible for 
damages resulting from arbitrary orders calling for the 
destruction of private property, but that subordinate 
officers could not refuse to carry out orders which were 
valid on their face, and therefore their actions in obedi­
ence were justifiable and released them from liability.
The fact situation in the Herlihy case was born 
out of the same labor dispute in Butte in 1914 which caused 
the governor, on September 1, to declare that Silver Bow 
County was in a state of insurrection. During the military
736 Am, Jur., Military, secs, II6, 117. 
^52 Mont. 601, 161 P. 164 (1916).
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occupation, on September 19, Major Donohue ordered his 
subordinate officers and a few enlisted men to destroy 
the stock of liquor in Herlihy*s saloon because Herlihy 
had violated Donohue*s orders by opening his saloon and 
selling some liquor during the curfew*
Justice Holloway held that the military’s destruc­
tion of Herlihy*s property was not justifiable as a valid 
use of the militia power since there was no proof that the 
destruction of private property was imminently and over­
whelmingly necessary. In so holding he stated that the 
militia during the insurrection performed the function of 
a strong arm of the governor by aiding in executing the 
law and in suppressing the insurrection, and therefore the 
militia was bound by the same authority which binds the 
governor.
Independently of the executive /the militia7 had no power or authority, except possibly with reference to its own internal affairs* It acted as an executive agency, subject to the orders of the governor and bound by the authority which he might lawfully exercise. The governor is at all times amenable to the Constitution and laws of the state. They are the charters of his powers and in them he must find the authority for his official acts*9
Thus the court held that since the militia was bound to the
same authority which binds the governor, the militia was
bound by the constitution and state laws and therefore the
952 Mont. 609.
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officers of the militia— but not the subordinates— would 
be held liable for any damages to private property which 
could not be justified under state law. With reference 
to the subordinate officers, the court held that since 
Donohue*s order was valid and reasonable of its face, the 
subordinates who acted in obedience to the order were 
released from liability since their actions in obedience 
were required.
Summary
The Montana supreme court has twice exercised a 
mode of interpretation, in the absence of clear consti­
tutional or statutory direction, which has strengthened 
the Montana governor*s militia power to the extent that 
the court has recognized that the constitution vests emer­
gency powers in the governor. The McDonald decision 
affirmed the existence and use of the militia, while it 
defined the limits of this power and held that the gover­
nor could not declare martial law per se. This decision 
illustrates among other things that the Montana consti­
tution does not provide that the governor may declare 
martial law and thereby supplant the authority of the 
civil courts. Nowhere does the constitution use the words 
"martial law," This decision can also be viewed as a 
contest between the executive and judicial branches of
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state government with the outcome being that the judiciary 
prevailed over the executive. The Herlihy decision again 
affirmed the existence and use of the militia power, while 
it held that an excessive use of this power— the unwar­
ranted destruction of private property— would cause the 
officer giving the order for the destruction to be liable 
for any resulting damages. Thus the court has been prag­
matic in affirming the existence and proper use of this 
power, while it has been wise to hold that the exercise of 
this power must fall within the constitutionally defined 
limits of the executive's powers.




The constitution of 1Ô89 evidently sought to anti­
cipate all contingencies which might arise in succession 
to the governorship. Article Vll, section 14, of the 
Montana constitution^ appeared to grant the right of guber­
natorial succession to the lieutenant-governor. The sec­
tion appeared to provide for a successor in almost any con­
tingency so that the administration of the executive depart­
ment would not be placed in jeopardy. Yet the first 
occasion for succession to the balance of a gubernatorial 
term vacated by resignation precipitated litigation and 
required the supreme court to rule whether the provisions 
were in fact clear and comprehensive.
The Lamey Case
On March 13, 1933, after serving as governor for 
only a couple of months. Governor Erickson resigned,
1 Mont. Const., Art, Vll, sec. 14. In case of the 
failure to qualify, the impeachment or conviction of felony 
or infamous crime of the governor, or his death, removal from office, resignation, absence from the state, or in­ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
the powers, duties and emoluments of the office, for the residue of the term, or until the disability shall cease, shall devolve upon the lieutenant-governor.
109
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whereupon Lieutenant-Governor Cooney assumed the office and 
powers of the governor. State ex rel. Lamey v, Mitchell^ 
soon held that upon a governor's resignation, his powers 
and duties were immediately transferred to the lieutenant- 
governor, The question before the court was whether there 
was a vacancy in the office of governor to be filled by a 
special election. Lamey and others argued that there was 
a vacancy and that the secretary of state should be com­
pelled to put their names on the ballot.
The opinion of the court, written by district judge
McKinnon sitting in place of Justice Angstraan, noted the
constitutional provision that if the governor should
resign, "the powers, duties and emoluments of the office,
for the residue of the term . . • shall devolve upon the
lieutenant-governor."^ From this constitutional provision,
the court held:
. , . when the Governor resigns or is permanently 
removed from office, there is no vacancy in the office of Governor in the sense that there is no one left with power to discharge the duties im­
posed upon the Governor. . . . The framers of the Constitution never intended that there should be any interim in which the affairs of the state should not be executed, for they said in explicit language 
that on the happening of any of the contingencies 
mentioned in section 14, supra, the powers, duties and emoluments of the office were to be immediately transferred to the Lieutenant-Governor, who is then
297 Mont. 252, 34 P.2d 369 (1934). 
^97 Mont. 256.
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given a mandate to discharge the duties of the office for the residue of the term for which the Governor was elected. He, as Lieutenant- Governor, acts as Governor and is empowered to perform the duties of that office.4
Summary
The Lamey case said, in effect, that the very 
existence of the lieutenant-governorship was intended to 
prevent a situation in which there would be no one left 
to discharge the duties imposed upon the governor. To 
argue, as Lamey had, that a vacancy occurred upon the 
resignation of the governor, seemed to disregard the prima 
facie intent of the constitutional draftsmen.^ In sus­
taining the argument that a vacancy existed upon the 
governor’s resignation, the court would have placed the 
administration of the executive branch in jeopardy. Ob­
viously, that was not the intention of the draftsmen. 
Instead, the intention would appear to provide for an 
efficient right of succession upon any of the mentioned 
acts in section 14.
The court’s decision strengthened the office and
^97 Mont, 256, 257.
%ut in a few states, the lieutenant-governor does 
not succeed to full office and powers of the governorship 
upon the death of the elected governor. In these few states, a special election is called to elect a new 
governor.
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powers of the governor since it has held that upon certain 
defined contingencies the gubernatorial office and powers 
will be executed by the lieutenant-governor. Had the 
court held that a vacancy existed in the office of the 
governor, this decision would have weakened the office 
since it would possibly have jeopardized the administra­
tion of the executive branch and the execution of the laws 
during the time the vacancy remained in effect.
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CHAPTER VIII
MISCELLANEOUS POWERS
This chapter reviews four additional powers of the 
governor which the Montana supreme court has had to con­
sider. The powers are: (1) to call in a district judge,
(2) to approve state contracts, (3) discretionary extra­
dition power, and (4) to proclaim elections.
The Power to Call in a District Judge 
The Smith Case 
The Montana supreme court has decided two cases, 
both fairly recent, which considered whether the governor, 
upon the application of any interested person, properly 
exercised his statutory power to call a district judge 
into a neighboring judicial district. State ex rel. Smith 
V ,  District Court^ held that the governor exceeded his 
statutory authority to call in a district judge from a 
neighboring judicial district when under a statute the dis­
qualified resident judges still had the primary authority 
and responsibility to call in a judge from a neighboring 
district.
^116 Mont. 251, 151 P.2d 500 (1944).
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On December 13, 1943» Judge Horsky of department
no, 1 of the first Judicial district ordered a temporary
injunction to be issued in an abatement case. The next
day, an affidavit of disqualification was filed against
him so he transferred the case to Judge Padbury of
department no, 2 where the injunction was dissolved.
Judge Padbury then planned to be absent from the state for
about a month, whereupon the county attorney on December 18
disqualified him. On the same day the acting governor, in
the absence of the governor, called in Judge Lynch from
2another district in accordance with section 8823 to pre­
side in the case. On December 28, Judge Lynch appeared 
but declined to assume jurisdiction of the case on the 
ground that under section 8868^ Judge Horsky, and not the 
governor, had the authority to call in another judge.
In delivering the opinion of the court. Justice Morris
If for any cause a district court is not or cannot 
be held in any county by the judge or judges thereof, or by 
a district judge requested by such judge or judges to hold 
such court, or if the business of the court in any county 
is not or cannot be dispatched with reasonable promptness, 
the governor may, upon application of any interested per­
son, by an order in writing, require some district judge to 
hold court in said county for such time as may be specified 
in the order. Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 8823 (1935),
^Mont, Rev. Codes, sec, 8868 (1935), This is a 
very lengthy statute providing for the disqualification of 
a district judge and for the calling in of another judge 
if no judge or judges in the district remains able to per­
form the judicial duties.
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stated that he believed it was improper for the governor 
to call in Judge Lynch, in accordance with section ÔÔ23, 
"while the power granted by section ÔÔ6Ô has not been ex­
hausted."^ Consequently, the court held that the governor 
should not have called Judge Lynch because: (1) while Judge 
Padbury was in the district, he had the primary responsi­
bility to call in another judge, and (2) while Judge Pad­
bury was absent from the state, the authority and responsi­
bility to call in another judge was vested in Judge Horsky 
who had remained at all times within the district. Thus, 
the court held that the governor should not have called in 
Judge Lynch under section 6Ô23, since the powers under 
section ÔÔ6Ô to call in a neighboring judge had not been 
exhausted by the judges within the judicial district.
The Bennett Case 
State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner^ held that the 
statute which authorizes the governor to require some dis­
trict judge to hold court in another district does not em­
power the governor to divest the duly elected and qualified 
district judge of his authority and jurisdiction.
The governor had issued executive orders directing 
two district judges from other judicial districts to come
^116 Mont. 256.
^123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747 (1950).
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into the fifth judicial district to "hold court" in the 
counties comprising the fifth judicial district "until the 
business of the court therein has been dispatched."^
Bennett, the judge of the fifth judicial district, com­
menced an original proceeding and sought a writ of prohi­
bition to restrain the two visiting district judges from 
proceeding under the governor*s executive orders. In 
bringing this action, Bennett asserted among other things 
that (1) the executive orders disregarded Article IV, 
section 1, of the Montana constitution which defines the 
separation of powers within Montana government, and (2) there 
was no statutory authority empowering the governor to make 
the orders.
Chief Justice Adair at the beginning of the majority
opinion noted that the governor*s "general authority is
narrowly limited by the Constitution."^ After he reviewed
all the constitutional provisions, he held that there was
"no provision of the constitution empowering the governor
Ôto make the executive orders in questions." In addition, 
he held that there were no statutory enactments which would 
authorize the making of the executive orders which would
^As quoted in 123 Mont. 417* 
^123 Mont. 423.
^123 Mont. 428.
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authorize the governor to "require some district judge to
9hold court" in another county under certain conditions.
However he stated that this statute neither authorized
"the governor to exclude or remove from office the duly
elected, qualified and acting judge of the district, nor
to fix the terms of court.^ To hold otherwise, he said,
"would place the business of the courts at the mercy of
11the chief executive,"
While present in his district and qualified and capable, he may not be divested of his authority and jurisdiction by an executive order of the governor and be forced to abdicate and stand aside while others take over his office and perform the duties imposed upon him by the constitution and necessarily attendant upon the office of dis­trict judge of the fifth judicial district.Under our constitution it is from the supreme court of this state rather than from the supreme executive power of the state that relief is to be had where a district court or a district judge is in error or in need of superintending guidance or 
correction,^ ̂
In holding that the governor was acting without 
authority to issue the executive orders, the chief justice 
concluded:
The inappropriateness of having an executive department administer the business affairs of
"%ont, Rev. Codes, sec. 93-312 (1947). This is 
the same statute that was cited in the Smith case as Mont 
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the court is manifest. The constitution clothes 
the governor with no judicial power nor does it 
authorize him either to transact or to direct the 
transaction of such judicial business.13
Justice Freebourn, in a separate opinion, stated
that he believed section 93-312 was unconstitutional but,
since the court in the Smith case had held the section to
be constitutional and operative, he believed the executive
orders of the governor were "justified and proper."^^
Justice Angstman, in another separate dissenting
opinion, disagreed with the majority because he believed
they had misapplied the facts to the law. He argued that
the governor’s orders did neither "divest Judge Bennett of
authority or jurisdiction over cases in which he /had not
been7 disqualified" nor did it force Judge Bennett to stand
aside "while others take over his o f f i c e . " ^ 5  Justice
Angstman concluded his dissent by arguing that since the
executive orders did not divest Judge Bennett of his
authority to hear and decide those cases in which he had
not been disqualified, and since it did not force him to
stand aside in his own court, the governor’s executive
orders were within the scope of section 93-312.
13123 Mont. 436. 
^^123 Mont. 440. 
1^123 Mont. 440.
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Summary
Both the Smith and Bennett decisions have ruled 
that the governor exceeded his statutory authority when 
he called in a district judge. In the Smith case, the 
court held that one of the disqualified resident judges 
should have called in another judge, instead of the 
governor. In the Bennett case, the court seems to have 
said (1) that recourse should first be had to the super­
visory power of the state supreme court, and (2) that if 
the problem still persists after recourse has been had to 
the state supreme court, then the governor can issue execu­
tive orders calling in another judge, but the orders should 
be limited so as not to divest the existing district judge 
of his authority or jurisdiction in those cases which he 
still has the authority and jurisdiction to hear.
For the purposes of this study, both the Smith 
and Bennett decisions have, in the absence of clear consti­
tutional or statutory direction, sustained the governor’s 
power to call in a district judge under certain circum­
stances, Both decisions have upheld the constitutionality 
of the statute giving this authority to the governor, al­
though in both cases, the court has held that the governor’s 
exercise of this authority was improper under the facts and 
circumstances of the cases. In both cases, the Montana 
supreme court has held that the governor’s attempted
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exercise of this statutory authority was excessive and 
transgressed into the performance of the judicial function 
which is the domain of the state judiciary. The court in 
both decisions has attempted to adhere to the doctrine of 
separation of powers by holding that the judicial function 
should be performed by the judiciary, unless there is a 
specific grant of judicial power to another branch of 
government by the constitution or statute.
This whole problem of the governor calling in a 
district judge might be resolved and the administration of 
justice advanced if the power was placed in the hands of 
the state supreme court and taken completely out of the 
governor's scope of responsibility. No valid reason is 
apparent why this judicial function should be vested in 
the governor, when it appears that the Montana supreme 
court might perform this function equally well without 
raising questions of separation of powers. Modern notions 
of judicial administration would strengthen the responsi­
bility of the highest court for the general administration
1Aof the state judicial system.
^^See David R. Mason and William F. Crowley,
”A Proposal to Modernize Montana's Judicial System," Montana Public Affairs Report (Missoula: Bureau of Govern-
ment Research, University of Montana, February 196B).
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The Power to Approve State Contracts
The Hogan Case
The only Montana supreme court decision to consider
the governor’s power to approve contracts was State ex rel.
State Publishing Company v. Hogan,̂  ̂  in which the court
held that contracts for state printing are invalid unless
signed by the governor when the state constitution and
statutes require such written approval by the governor.
The constitutional provision involved in the case
read in part:
. . , and the printing, and binding and distribu­tion of the laws, journals, and department reports and other printing and binding . . . shall be per­formed under contract, to be given to the lowest responsible bidder. * , . No member . . .  of the government shall be in any way interested in any such contract; and all such contracts shall be subject to the approval of the governor and state 
treasurer. °
The statutory provision required that "all contracts made 
by the board must be approved by the governor and the state 
treasurer^ On December 20, 1Ô9Ô, the state board of 
examiners awarded a printing contract to the State Pub­
lishing Company which had submitted the lowest and best bid 
for certain printing. However, Secretary of State Hogan 
refused to deliver the papers to be printed on the grounds
1722 Mont. 3Ô4, 56 P. 8lS (1899).
I^Mont, Const., Art. V, sec. 30.
^^Mont. Codes Ann,, sec, 710 (Booth 1895).
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that the Montana constitution and statutes required that 
all contracts entered into by the state board of examiners 
for such printing and binding were subject to the approval 
of the governor and state treasurer.
The three-man court, in a Per Curiam opinion, held 
that the governor* s approval was an indispensible element 
of the contract and that there could be no valid and en­
forceable contract between the parties until the governor 
had approved the contract. The court perceived this con­
tract approval power to be similar to the governor*s veto 
power and concluded that this approval power exists as **a 
check upon possible extravagances of the Board of Exami­
ners.**^^
Summary
The establishment of this contract approval power 
in the governor, both by the constitution and by statute, 
has added to the powers of the state chief executive. The 
Montana supreme court through the Hogan decision has sus­
tained this grant since the court held that the governor’s 
approval is an indispensible element to such a contract. 
The decision placed the responsibility for reviewing and 
approving such state contracts squarely on the shoulders 
of the chief executive.
^°22 Mont. 390.
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For the purposes of this study, the Hogan decision 
has no special interest since the court rendered the deci­
sion on the basis of clear constitutional and statutory 
direction which required no interpretative function.
The Discretionary Extradition Power 
The Booth Case
The only Montana supreme court decision concerning
the governor's discretionary extradition power was State v.
21Booth, in which the court held in part that the motives 
which induce a governor to act on a requisition for a war­
rant for extradition are not reviewable in a habeas corpus 
proceeding.
The governor of Oregon requested the governor of 
Montana to issue a warrant for the extradition of Booth. 
Thereafter, Booth was detained by virtue of the Montana 
governor's warrant whereupon, on August 13» 1957, he 
petitioned a district court for a writ of habeas corpus 
alleging, among other things, that the application for his 
extradition had not been made in good faith by the state 
of Oregon.
Chief Justice Harrison noted that "where a warrant 
of extradition is sought for some ulterior purpose . . .  it 
is within the discretionary power of the governor of the
^^134 Mont. 235, 32Ô P.2d 1104 (195Ô).
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state to refuse to issue it.”^^ But the chief justice 
held
. . . the motives which induced a governor to grant, honor or refuse a requisition will not be inquired into on habeas corpus, since such inquiry would be opposed to principles of public policy and to the freedom of action by the execu­tive within its constitutional authority.23
Summary
In the Booth decision, the Montana supreme court 
exercised a mode of interpretation, in the absence of 
clear constitutional or statutory direction, which 
strengthened the powers of the Montana governor since it 
has noted that the governor has the right and responsi­
bility to exercise his discretion in extradition matters. 
But even more important, it strengthened the powers of the 
governor since it has held that the courts will not look 
into the motives of the executive when he exercises his 
discretion in granting or denying a requisition for extra­
dition.
^^134 Mont. 247. For a discussion of the duty of 
the governor of the asylum state to determine whether a 
crime has been charged, see 40 ALR 2d 1155» sec. 3»
23-134 Mont. 247. For an additional discussion of 
this subject, see 94 ALR 1493 *
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The Power to Proclaim Elections 
Introduction
A Montana statute provides that the governor must 
give notice by proclamation to the electorate of certain 
impending e l e c t i o n s , W i t h  reference to this power the 
Montana supreme court has held that insufficiency of notice 
by the governor to the electorate in a general election 
will not affect the validity of the election. In addition, 
the court has held that insufficiency of notice in a 
special election to fill a vacancy will not affect the 
election’s validity. Thus, for both general and special 
elections the court has held that insufficiency of notice 
will not affect the election’s v a l i d i t y . T h i s  issue of 
the governor’s election proclamation power has been before 
the Montana supreme court on three different occasions: 
twice directly, and once quite indirectly.
The Breen Case
The subject of the governor’s election proclamation 
power first arose indirectly in State ex rel. Breen v.
T o o l e . S i n c e  the case was a mandamus action to compel the
^^Mont. Rev. Codes, sec. 23-103 (1947).
^^For a short introductory discussion of the effects 
of notice by proclamation, see note in 120 Am, St. Rep. 794 
(1908).
Mont. 4, 79 P. 403 (1905).
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governor to issue a certificate of election to Breen, the 
court decided the case on the merits of the question 
whether the writ of mandamus should be issued and did not 
resolve the proclamation issue: the effect of the governor’s 
proclamation which had called for an election of two judges 
from the second judicial district instead of three.
On May 4, 1901, the governor appointed McClernan to 
fill the vacancy in one of the judgeships of the second 
judicial district. At the next election in November, 1901, 
McClernan was elected to fill the remaining term of the 
judgeship. Later in November, 1904, there were six candi­
dates for the three judgeships; Breen polled the third 
highest number of votes, and thereafter demanded that the 
governor issue him a commission as judge.
Breen argued that all the terms for district judge 
were uniform, and thus all three judgeships were up for 
election in 1904; therefore, as a consequence, since he 
received the third highest number of votes, he was entitled 
to a commission for the third judgeship. The state, how­
ever, argued that Breen had not alleged and proven that 
there was a candidate for the third judgeship— McClernan*s 
judgeship— and therefore the governor could not be com­
pelled to issue a certificate of election for the third 
judgeship since Breen had not proven that he had a clear 
and legal right to it.
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The court conceded two points with reference to 
Breen^s argument: first, there was a strong constitutional 
basis for the argument that the terms of the three judge­
ships were uniform; and second, that the formalities of 
notice are not binding in a general election. Thus, the 
court admitted that the proclamation was not binding on 
the election since it was a general election. However, at 
this point, the court dropped the proclamation issue since 
it was not controlling for the central issue of granting 
the writ of mandamus. The court held that the writ of 
mandamus should not be issued against the governor since 
Breen had failed to show that he had a clear legal right 
in the commission in order to justify the issuance of the 
writ against the governor. In other words, the court held 
that Breen had failed to show that he was a candidate for 
the third judgeship, and therefore he had not shown that 
he had a legal right in the commission.
The Patterson Case 
The second Montana supreme court decision to dis­
cuss the governor's election proclamation power was State 
ex rel. Patterson v. Lentz, in which the court held that 
insufficiency of notice in the governor’s proclamation of
'̂̂ 50 Mont. 322, U 6  P. 932 (1915).
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a vacancy in the office of district judge would not invali­
date the special election to fill the judgeship when the 
electorate had actual notice of the vacancy by means of the 
candidates’ campaigns.
The facts were that in the governor’s proclamation 
calling for a general election there was no reference to 
the vacancy in one of the district judgeships to be filled 
by special election, but the proclamation did state that, 
among other officers, there was to be elected ”a district
2 Ajudge in any judicial district where a vacancy may exist.”
The court stated that the election to fill the
judgeship was a special election, and therefore it was
"incumbent upon the governor to include in his proclamation
specific mention of the fact that in a particular district”
29an election was to be held. In addition, it went on to 
state that the governor’s proclamation gave insufficient 
notice to the people of the special election because it 
"left the people in any district to ascertain for them­
selves whether the emergency existed requiring them to elect 
a judge, instead of informing them definitely that such an 
emergency existed and that they should proceed with the
^^As quoted in 50 Mont. 333» 
Mont. 343.
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30election.”
However, even in view of this fact that the gover­
nor’s proclamation was insufficient notice to the people, 
the court held that after an election the rule requiring 
official notice by publication is not as binding as before
the election. After an election, the court held that the
validity of the special election depends upon ’’whether the 
electors generally had notice and generally indicated 
their choice of candidates
. . . inasmuch as the people have the right to 
choose officers to serve them no informality in 
the election will suffice to defeat their will, 
as expressed by their votes, if in fact it
appears that they had actual notice and did
indicate their c h o i c e . 32
The court held, as a consequence, that the insuf­
ficiency of notice in the governor’s proclamation was not 
sufficient to invalidate the special election since the 
electors had actual notice through the candidates’ cam­
paigns that a judgeship was vacant and up for election.
The Nordquist Case
The third Montana supreme court decision discussing 
the governor’s election proclamation power was Nordquist v.
3O5O Mont. 345. 
3150 Mont. 345. 
^^50 Mont. 343.
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33Ford, in which the court held that the governor’s procla­
mation did not have to make reference to a referendum: a 
measure referred by the legislature to the people.
Nordquist sought to enjoin the governor from 
issuing and selling bonds for the construction and repairs 
at the state hospital. Sale and issuance of bonds for 
this purpose had been authorized by Chapter 168 of the 
Laws of 1939, "which was an Act passed by the legislature 
and by it referred to the people at the general election 
in 1940."^^
Nordquist claimed that the failure to publish the 
governor’s proclamation with mention of Chapter 168 invali­
dated the law, and therefore the governor should be en­
joined from the issuance and sale of the bonds under the 
law. Justice Angstman held:
, . . under the law there is no requirement that the Governor’s proclamation make any reference to a measure referred by the legislature to the people. Obviously if the proclamation need make 
no reference to /such7 referendum measures, then failure to publish the proclamation becomes im­material so far as this point is concerned.35
The court thus held that référendums need not be incorpor­
ated into the governor’s proclamation, and therefore need
^^112 Mont. 278, 114 P.2d 1071 (1941). 
34i12 Mont. 280.
35ii2 Mont. 283.
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not be published throughout the state.
Summary
The Montana supreme court on three separate 
occasions has discussed the Montana governor’s election 
proclamation power. The first discussion was in the Breen 
case in which the court implied, as dictum, that when the 
time and place of an election are fixed by statute, as 
they are in a general election, the existence of the 
statute is notice to all the electors of the election, 
and therefore the failure of the governor to give complete 
notice by proclamation as required by law does not invali­
date the election. This dictum seems to weaken the elec­
tion proclamation power of the governor since the court 
defines the nature of this power as directory and minis­
terial, and not mandatory and discretionary. However, 
this power should only be directory and ministerial. This 
is not a major power of the governor. Neither should the 
statute impose a mandatory obligation on the governor, nor 
should the governor be able to defeat a general election 
if the power is improperly exercised.
The Patterson case held that insufficiency of notice 
in the governor’s proclamation was not sufficient to invali­
date a special election to fill a vacancy when the electors 
had actual notice of the election by means of the
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candidates* campaigns. Again it could be argued that this 
holding weakens the governor*s election proclamation power 
since it fails to impose a mandatory obligation on the 
governor to perform his duty of giving proper notice. How­
ever, this power should not be binding on the governor. 
Even in a special election, it should not be binding if 
the electors had actual notice. The Patterson decision
gives the better rule since it holds that the lack of
statutory notice by proclamation to fill a vacancy in a
special election does not invalidate that election if the
electors had actual notice of the election.
The third discussion was in the Nordquist case 
which held that the governor*s proclamation did not have 
to make reference to any referendum. This case also 
affects the governor's power, but not in the same manner 
as the first two cases. They weakened the governor's 
power by holding that his statutory obligation to provide 
notice was not mandatory; whereas the Nordquist case 
weakens the governor's power by holding that all things to 
be voted on in an election need not be stated in the 
proclamation.
Although it can be argued that these decisions 
weaken the governor's election proclamation power, this 
study agrees with the court that the duty and responsi­
bility of the governor to provide election notice should
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only be directory, not mandatory. This formalistic power 
should neither impose a mandatory obligation of the 
governor nor be essential to the conduct of a valid elec­
tion. To impose a meticulous observance of detail as to 
all elements in elections on the governor would not really 
strengthen the governorship. In addition, to invalidate 
an election for a minor formal failure of such detail would 
diminish popular control without any sensible increase of 
gubernatorial authority. In conclusion, this study recom­
mends that this power and responsibility should be taken 
out of the governor*s office and placed in the secretary 
of state’s office since he is the major election officer 
in Montana.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of this study has been that the 
Montana supreme court, when presented with a case or 
controversy concerning the Montana governorship, in the 
absence of clear constitutional or statutory direction 
should exercise a mode of interpretation vAiich will 
strengthen the office and powers of the Montana governor 
since it is now desirable to have strong executives in 
state government. Thus, this study is an analysis of the 
Montana governorship as seen through the eyes of the 
Montana supreme court, tested against the assumed desir­
ability of a particular mode of judicial interpretation.
A few of these decisions have dealt with important 
powers of the governor and have raised significant issues; 
others have dealt with relatively unimportant or minor 
powers and have involved little interpretive function.
This might be expected since lawyers often must raise minor 
issues to get their client ̂ s interest before the court.
This study has witnessed examples of this; notably most of 
the cases raising the issue of the governor’s power to pro­
claim a special session. In these cases the issue was
134
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whether the legislation was within the call of the gover­
nor’s proclamation or message. In all but one of the cases, 
the legislation was clearly within the boundaries of the 
governor’s call, and the court accordingly sustained the 
governor’s authority to issue the call and to limit or 
extend the boundaries of the subject matter of that call. 
Nevertheless, the issue was raised by counsel as he argued 
his client’s interest before the court.
Another example would be the cases raising the 
issue of the governor’s power to proclaim elections.
There counsel was reaching for an issue by raising the 
question of whether the election had been mentioned in the 
election proclamation.
This study has examined 38 cases and 26 proved to 
be relevant for the hypothesis. A few were important and 
have been recognized nationally, and therefore deserve 
special attention. These cases are: the Chumasero case 
(mandamus), the Veto case (veto power), and the McDonald 
case (militia power).
Still others were important within the state since 
they have been concerned with major powers of the governor 
and have been relevant for the study’s hypothesis (see 
Table 1). These cases include: the Jardine case, which 
recognized a vacancy that could be filled by guberna­
torial appointment; the Craighead case, which provided
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that the governor could remove an appointee at will; the 
Sullivan, Holt and Matson cases, which restricted the 
governor*s removal power; the Livingstone case, which 
applied the governor*s approval power to constitutional 
amendments; the pardon power cases, which respected the 
governor*s pardon power; the Herlihy case, which affirmed 
the governor*s militia power while it defined limits of 
liability; and the Lame y case, which established the right 
of succession,
A student of state government would naturally 
assume that state supreme courts would be more persuaded 
and influenced by the concept of a strong governor as it 
became more established and popularly believed by the 
citizenry and public officials. This would mean that as 
the concept grew, so would the persuasive effect grow on 
state supreme courts which would render decisions manifest­
ing this concept. The three most recent cases in this 
study do indicate this trend: the Booth case (extradition 
discretion), the Livingstone case (approval power), and 
the Herman-Roy case (pardon power). However, all three 
of the Montana court * s more noted decisions which 
strengthened the Montana governorship were rendered rela­
tively early in the court * s history: the Chumasero case 
(1Ô75), the McDonald case (1914), and the Veto case (1923). 
This fact might be cited to support the notion that the
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court was as much concerned with a strong governor in the 
early days of statehood as it is now— Ô0 years later—  
in the era of "creative federalism,"^
The court, obviously, is not primarily respon­
sible for the fact that Montana has a weak governorship.
The primary source of weakeners are the constitution, the 
legislative assembly and practice of past governors; how­
ever, this does not exempt the court from any fault. The 
court can be faulted in one area especially, the removal 
power--one of the governor’s really major and important 
powers. The court has weakened the governor’s removal 
power by not allowing the governor the right to remove 
appointees at will.
Thus, in conclusion, it has been demonstrated that 
the court, both early in the state’s history and more 
significantly in recent years, has exercised a mode of 
interpretation, in the absence of clear constitutional or 
statutory direction, to strengthen the Montana governor­
ship. However, it also has been proven that with reference 
to the removal power three of the four decisions have 
weakened the Montana governorship.
A popular term used during the early years of 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency to symbolize the "new" 
federal-state relationship.










































^These three mandamus decisions strengthen the governorship to the 
extent that they recognize executive discretion and will not control this 
discretion by mandamus; however, they weaken the governorship to the extent 
that they recognize that some executive actions are ministerial.
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^This décision with reference to the governor's proclamation power 
neither strengthens nor weakens the power; however, with reference to the 
use of mandamus to control executive action, this decision strengthens the 
office of the governor.
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